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Federal Statutes
PATENT LAW-THE STANDARD OF SYNERGISM SHOULD NOT BE USED TO
DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF COMBINATION PATENTS UNDER

SECTION

103

OF THE PATENT ACT.

Rengo Co. v. Molins Machine Co. (1981)

In August 1974, Rengo Company, Ltd.,' received patent No.
3,831,502 (the '502 patent) from the United States Patent Office for an
apparatus that increased the speed and efficiency of a corrugator, 2 a
machine that produces corrugated paperboard used in cardboard boxes.3
The plaintiff's apparatus consisted of a combination of several wellknown elements: a rotary shear, slitter-scorer units, and a movable feeder
plate.4 The major innovation of the plaintiff's device was that it enabled
the operator to change the size of the box blanks without stopping the
machine to change the slitting and scoring pattern 5 as was required
when using a traditional corrugator 6
1. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., No. 78-2000 (D.N.J. July 31, 1980).
The inventor of the device involved in this case is Masateru Tokuno, Senior
Managing Director of the plaintiff Rengo. Id. slip op. at 1 n.l. Mr. Tokuno
assigned his rights to his invention to Rengo, a Japanese corporation that
manufactures corrugated paperboard. Id. slip op. at 2 n.1. An additional
plaintiff, Simon Container Machinery Ltd., is a British corporation that manuactures equipment for producing corrugated paperboard. Id. A subsidiary
of the British corporation conducts business in the United States. Id.
2. Id. slip op. at 6. A corrugator consists of seven components: 1) a single
facer machine; 2) a bridge; 3) a double facer machine; 4) a rotary shear; 5)
slitter-scorer units; 6) a cut-off machine; and 7) a stacker or sheet delivery machine. Id. slip op. at 3. The plaintiff's patent encompassed only elements
four through six. Id.
3. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 537 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3402 (1981). For a description of the operation of a corrugator, see note 6 infra.
4. 657 F.2d at 537.
5. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., No. 78-2000, slip op. at 6-9 (D.N.J.
July 31, 1980). The plaintiff conceded that its machine consisted of a conventional rotary shear and slitter-scorer unit and had no components which
were novel to the industry at the time it filed its patent application. Id.
slip op. at 6-7. By combining these well-known elements with a movable
feeding plate, the Rengo corrugator could direct the flow of the paperboard
after it emerged from the rotary shear to any one of three separate paths, each
of which had its own slitter-scorer unit. Id. slip op. at 7-8. The plaintiffs
argued that this development, a corrugator with change order capability at full
running speed, was a major advance in the manufacturing of paperboard. Id.
slip op. at 8-9. The defendant, however, contended that this combination of
well-known elements did not constitute a patentable inventive contribution
because it did not produce a new or unexpected result. Id. slip op. at 9.
6. 657 F.2d at 537. In a conventional corrugator, three webs of paper
are first corrugated into paperboard. Id. The paperboard then flows along
a single pathway until it is cut to a predetermined width and creased by the
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The plaintiff installed the corrugator device in two of its Japanese
plants in January 1972 and filed Japanese patent applications for the
apparatus in February and April of 1972. 7 The plaintiff's application
for a United States patent was filed in January 1973.8
The defendant, the Langston Division of the Molins Machine Company,9 sent two representatives to Japan in 1976 to observe the operation
of the Rengo corrugator. 10 By December 1977, the defendant had begun
development of a corrugator that could perform instant order changes
and was similar to the Rengo corrugator except that the defendant's
apparatus had two, rather than three, flow paths." In early 1978, the
defendant began soliciting orders for its instant change system. 12 In
August 1978, Rengo brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey,' s alleging that Molins had infringed claims
slitter-scorer unit. Id. Finally, it is cut into box blanks of predetermined

length by the rotary shear. Id. The plaintiff's apparatus, in contrast, was
capable of diverting the paperboard to three separate pathways, thereby enabling the operator of a Rengo corrugator to achieve "instant order changes"

by changing the slitting and scoring pattern without slowing down the cor-

rugator. Id.
7. Id. at 537-38.
8. Rengo did not receive its American patent until August 27, 1974. Id.
at 537.
9. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., No. 78-2000, slip op. at 2 n.1 (D.N.J.
July 31, 1980). The Molins Machine Company is a New York corporation.
Id. Its Langston Division manufactures and sells machinery used in the production of corrugated paperboard. Id.
10. 657 F.2d at 538.
11. Id. The defendant had begun to develop an instant change system
in the mid-1970's in response to market pressures and customer demands. Id.
12. Id.
13. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., No. 78-2000, slip op. at 14 n.27 (D.N.J.
July 31, 1980). The plaintiff brought his action for patent infringement under
35 U.S.C. §§ 271 & 281 (1976). Id. slip op. at 1. Section 271 provides in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a)
(1976). Section 281 states: "A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent." 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1976).
The defendant denied infringement and filed a counterclaim seeking a
judgment that the plaintiff's patent was invalid for obviousness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1976) and indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). No. 78-2000,
slip op. at 1-2 n.2.
At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved to dismiss the
plaintiff's patent infringement claim, arguing that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant had actually violated 35 U.S.C. §271(a) prior to the
initiation of the lawsuit. Id. slip op. at 13-14. Specifically, Molins contended
that it had done no more than advertise and solicit orders for its instant change
system when Rengo filed its complaint and that this did not constitute a "sale"
in violation of § 271. Id. slip op. at 13-15. The district court concluded that it
could assert jurisdiction over the action on the basis of the defendant's counterclaim since one who has a "reasonable and well grounded fear" that he is
vulnerable to an action for patent infringement may bring an action for
declaratory judgment before he actually manufactures, uses or sells the potentially infringing device. Id. slip op. at 16 n.29b, 17.
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1 and 24 of the '502 patent. 14 The district court found that the Japanese
rather than the American patent applications established the date of
invention 15 and held that the '502 patent was invalid for obviousness.' 6
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
14. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., No. 78-2000, slip op. at 1 (D.N.J.
July 31, 1980).
15. Id. slip op. at 26. In determining whether the '502 patent was invalid
for obviousness, the court was faced with the critical threshold question of
whether the plaintiff was entitled to claim the date of its Japanese application
as the reference point for the analysis of the prior art. For a discussion of
the Third Circuit's resolution of this issue, see note 95 infra. The defendant
argued that the foreign applications were not entitled to priority since the
plaintiff's omission of certain circuitry diagrams from the specifications did not
comport with the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). Rengo
Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., No. 78-2000, slip op. at 21 (D.N.J. July 31, 1980).
For the disclosure requirements of § 112, see note 95 infra. The district court
noted that the "enabling disclosure" requirement of § 112 must be evaluated
in terms of the level of skill in the pertinent art. No. 78-2000, slip op. at 22.
The court further noted that the level of skill in the Rengo case was very high
since those involved in the corrugator industry generally have a degree in
engineering and a familiarity with corrugator systems. Id. slip op. at 23. Thus,
the district court concluded that because the disclosures in Rengo's Japanese
patent would make it possible for one skilled in the pertinent art to make and
use the invention without "extensive experimentation" or "inventive effort,"
the requirements of § 112 had been satisfied. Id.
16. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., No. 78-2000, slip op. at 33 (D.N.J.
July 31, 1980). In deciding that the Rengo patent was invalid for obviousness,
the district court initially noted that the obviousness of a patent must be determined on the basis of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). Id. slip op. at 18. For the
provisions of § 103, see note 43 and accompanying text infra. In applying § 103,
the court made the necessary factual inquiries established by the Supreme Court.
No. 78-2000, slip op. at 18, citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
For a discussion of Graham, see notes 45-48 and accompanying text infra. In
making the factual inquiries required by Graham, the district court examined
the prosecution history of the Rengo patent and discussed five patents of record
considered by the Examiner as well as seven other patents that the defendant
alleged had not been considered by the Patent Office prior to issuing the '502
patent. No. 78-2000, slip op. at 26-29. The court found that all of the component elements of the Rengo patent appeared in the prior art. Id. slip op.
at 30. The plaintiff argued that since its device was capable of instant order
changes, the combination of these elements created a patentable improvement
over the prior art. The court rejected this argument and noted that "the inquiry to be made is whether the combination produces a 'nonobvious synergistic result' in which 'the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts.'"
Id. (citation omitted). The court concluded that "the difference between the
prior art and the claims in suit would have been obvious to a person having
ordinary skill in art in 1972." Id. In reaching this conclusion the court
declined to consider the "secondary factors" that were described in Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). Id. slip op. at 32. For a description of
these secondary factors, see note 48 and accompanying text infra.
The court also stressed that it was significant that the patent in the instant case was a combination patent since the Third Circuit, in Hadco Prod.,
Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1023 (1972), had indicated that combination patents should be scrutinized with
special care. No. 78-2000, slip op. at 18-19, citing Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter
Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
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Circuit,' 7 while agreeing with the district court that the plaintiff could

assert the Japanese filing date as the date of invention,' 8 vacated and
remanded, 19 holding that the synergism standard should not be used to
determine the validity of a combination patent. Rengo Co. v. Molins
Machine Co., 657 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3402 (1981).
Article I, section eight of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power to issue patents. 2o

In enacting the Patent Act of

1793,21 Congress established two criteria for patentability: novelty and
utility. 22 In 1851, a third criteria for patentability, "invention," was
mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. 23 In Hotchkiss, the Court held that a patent for a door knob
made of porcelain or clay rather than the conventional materials of wood
17. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Adams and Garth and Judge
Dumbauld of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Judge Adams wrote the opinion of the court
and Judge Dumbauld filed a concurring opinion.

18. 657 F.2d at 550.
19. Id. at 546.
20. The Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have the power
...to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court has
observed:
The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation. This qualified
authority, unlike the power often exercised in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries by the English Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the "useful arts." It was written against the
backdrop of the practices-eventually curtailed by the Statute of
Monopolies-of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites
in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the
public.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1965).
21. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). For historical
background on this Act, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1965).
See also S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2394, 2394-97 [hereinafter cited as S. REP No. 1979]; Patent
Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 before the Subcomm. of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (statements of Charles
J. Zinn & P. J. Federico) [hereinafter cited at 1951 Hearings].
22. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). In the 1793 Act,
Congress provided that any American citizen who had invented "any new and
useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter" was entitled to
apply for a patent. 1 Stat. at 319. Although this Act referred to inventors
and inventions, it was generally interpreted as requiring only novelty and
utility for a patent. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1965);
Fenton, Combination Patents and Synergism: Must 2 + 2 = 5?, 37 WASH. gc
LEE L. REv. 1206, 1208 (1980). The first patent law was enacted on April 10,
1790 in the second session of the first Congress of the United States. See 1951
Hearings, supra note 21 (statement of P.J. Federico); S. REP. No. 1979, supra
note 21, at 2396.
23. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
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or metal was invalid for lack of invention.2 4 In so doing, it established
the rule that "unless more ingenuity . . .were required . . . than were
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there
was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of invention." 25
The Supreme Court adhered to the invention standard for the next
one hundred years despite its lack of precision and inconsistent application by the lower courts. 26 As early as 1891, the Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of defining "invention." 27 In attempting to apply
the invention standard in subsequent years, the Court utilized the imprecise but increasingly strict rubrics 28 of "intuitive genius" 29 and
"flash of creative genius." 30
24. Id. at 262.
25. Id. at 267.
26. See Fenton, supra note 22, at 1209 n.25; Note, Patentability of Mechanical Combinations: A Definition of Synergism, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1043, 1045
(1979). See also Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 967
(7th Cir. 1979). In Republic Industries, the Seventh Circuit noted that "the
imprecision of the 'invention' standard resulted in an inconsistent and unpredictable body of law because it required that the decision of patentability be
based ultimately upon the subjective whims of the reviewing court." Id. at
967 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of Republic Industries, see note 64
and accompanying text infra.
27. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891) (invention "cannot
be defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in determining
whether a particular device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or
not").
28. Several commentators have suggested that by the 1930's and 1940's
courts used the invention standard to impose increasingly severe standards of
patentability. See Note, Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.: Combination Patents Now
Require Synergistic Effects, 15 Hous. L. REV. 157, 160 n.34 (1977); Note, supra
note 26, at 1046. For instance, one commentator noted that while in the 1920's
courts found 30% to 40% of the patents in infringement cases to be valid,
in 1942 courts found only 10% of litigated patents to be valid. See Note,
supra note 28, at 160 n.34.
29. Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597, 607-08 (1895). The Court found a
patent for a clay disintegrator valid after noting that
it often requires as acute a perception of the relation between cause
and effect, and as much of the peculiar intuitive genius which is a
characteristic of great inventors, to grasp the idea that a device used
in one art may be made available in another, as would be necessary to
create the device de novo.
Id. at 607-08.
30. Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
Another problem with the invention standard was that the Patent and Trade.
mark Office tended to ignore it, adhering instead to a more liberal standard of
patentability. See Fenton, supra note 22, at 1209. The Supreme Court was
critical of this leniency: "We have observed a notorious difference between
the standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts. While many
reasons can be adduced to explain the discrepancy, one may well be the free
rein often exercised by Examiners in their use of the concept of 'invention.'',
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1965).
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Application of the invention standard to combination patents proved
especially difficult.8 ' In the 1873 case of Hailes v. Van Wormer,3 2 the
Court articulated general guidelines for determining when a combination consisting of old, well-known elements was an invention for patent
purposes."3 The Court concluded that a combination of old elements
could constitute an invention only if the combination created a new
and different result.34

In subsequent cases,'

5

the principles articulated

in Hailes were reduced to the rule that the mere aggregation of wellknown parts that failed to produce a new or different effect was not a
0
patentable invention.'
31. See Note, Synergism Fails to Add Up: Republic Industries, Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 41 U. PirT. L. REV. 761, 765 (1980). A combination patent
is a patent "issued for a device comprised solely of old elements known to those
skilled in the art." Id. at 762 n.5. For a discussion of the difficulty in distinguishing a combination patent from other patents, see note 91 infra.
32. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 353 (1873).
33. Id. at 368. The device at issue in Hailes combined the best elements
of a reservoir stove with those of a revertible-draft stove to create an improved
self-feeding stove. Id. at 367-68.
34. Id. at 374. The Court concluded that the plaintiff's patent lacked
invention. Id. It also found that because the defendants' combination of
well-known parts did not create a new or different result, their device was not
an invention and thus could not infringe the plaintiff's patent. Id. at 372.
In reaching these conclusions, the Court established the following rule for deciding whether a combination patent possessed the requisite inventiveness:
[T]he results must be a product of the combination, and not a mere
aggregate of several results each the complete product of one of the
combined elements. . . . No one by bringing together several old
devices without producing a new and useful result the joint product
of the elements of the combination and something more than an
aggregate of old results, can acquire a right to prevent others from
using the same devices.
Id. at 368.
35. See, e.g., Lincoln Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549
(1938); Grinnell Washing Mach. Co. v. E.E. Johnson Co., 247 U.S. 426, 433
(1918); Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U.S. 310, 318 (1881).
36. In 1881, the Court found a combination patent for a plastic mold for
making crucibles invalid because none of the well-known elements of this patent
"contributes to the combined result any new feature" or "adds to the combination anything more than its separate independent effect." Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U.S. 310, 318 (1881). Thirty years later, the Court invalidated a
combination patent for a gearing device to improve the wringing operation of
a washing machine because "[n]o new function is evolved from this combination; the new result, so far as one is achieved, is only that which arises from
the well-known operation of each one of the elements." Grinnell Washing
Mach. Co. v. E.E. Johnson Co., 247 U.S. 426, 433 (1918). Finally, in 1938 the
Court concluded that a combination patent for lubricating bearings that consisted of well-known parts was invalid because "[t]he mere aggregation of a
number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, perform or produce
no new or different function or operation than that theretofore performed or
produced by them, is not patentable invention." Lincoln Co. v. Stewart-Warner
Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938). See also Great Atl. &:Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950). The Court noted that in the course
of attempting to decide when a combination patent displayed the requisite
invention, "the term 'aggregation' came to signify its absence." Id. at 151.
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In 1950, the Court attempted to establish a more definite standard
of invention for combination patents in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.3 7 by determining that "only when

the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation
of old devices patentable." 38 This definition of patentability has subsequently been described as "synergism." 39 The Court emphasized that
this was a rigorous test, and it cautioned that "[c]ourts should scrutinize
combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and
improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old elements." 4o
Soon after the Court handed down the Great Atlantic decision,
Congress revised and codified American patent law in the Patent Act
of 1952. 41 This Act retained the requirements of novelty and utility
for patentability,4 2 but in section 103 Congress substituted a requirement of "nonobviousness" for "invention." 43 Under this standard, a
37. 340 U.S. 147 (1950). The Court observed that while it had sustained
combination patents in the past, it had never elaborated a consistent test for
these patents. Id. at 150-51.
38. Id. at 152.
39. See, e.g., Note, supra note 31, at 766. Courts have found synergism an
elusive term to define. Two of the most common definitions of synergism are
that the combination as a whole displays an effect greater than the sum of its
parts and that one of the elements functions differently in combination than
it does when used alone. Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d
963, 969-70 (7th Cir. 1979). For other judicial definitions of synergism, see id.
at 970 n.20.
40. 340 U.S. at 152. Justice Douglas emphasized that this strict standard
of patentability reflected the constitutional limitations on the granting of
patents. Id. at 154 (Douglas, J., concurring). For a discussion of the constitutional power to issue patents and the limitations on that power, see note
20 supra.
41. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976). For historical background of the Act, see
Fenton, supra note 22, at 1206-11; Note, supra note 28, at 161-62; Note, supra
note 26, at 1047-49; Note, supra note 31, at 767-68.
42. See Fenton, supra note 22, at 1210. The requirements of novelty and
utility were codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102.
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). Section 103 provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title,
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertainsL
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made.
Id. See also 1951 Hearings, supra note 21, at 38 (statement of P.J. Federico).
During this hearing, Mr. Federico, Examiner in Chief of the United States
Patent Office, noted:
Section 103 does something attempted for the first time in our statute,
and that is to write down a condition which exists in the law and
has existed for well over 100 years, but only by decisions of the
court. . . . This section may introduce more definiteness and have
some stabilizing effect, and may prevent great departures which have
appeared in some cases.
Id.
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patent was invalid "if the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art [were] such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made." 44
Thirteen years after the enactment of section 103, the Supreme
Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. 4 5 concluded that the statutory test
of nonobviousness was a codification of the prior judicial invention
standard but the court noted that "nonobviousness" was more objective
and more amenable to several basic factual inquiries. 46 Specifically, the
Court held that in determining whether an invention is nonobvious,
courts should consider three factors: the extent of the prior art; the
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; and the level
of skill in the pertinent art.4 7 In addition, the Court emphasized the
relevance to the nonobviousness test of such secondary considerations as
44. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).

45. 383 U.S. 1 (1965).

In Graham, the Court tested the validity of two

patents, one for a clamp to prevent vibrating plow shanks and the other for a
"hold-down" cap commonly used on insecticide bottles prior to shipment. Id.
at 4-5. In the suit involving the plow shank clamp, the plaintiff, Graham,
obtained a patent in 1950 (the '811 patent) for a spring clamp that was designed to enable chisel plows to move through rocky soil by absorbing the
shocks that would otherwise break the plow shanks. Id. at 21. Shortly after
receiving the '811 patent, Graham attempted to improve his design and he
received another patent (the '798 patent) for a vibrating plow shank clamp in
1953. Graham brought suit, claiming that the defendant had manufactured
devices that infringed the '798 patent. Id.
The Court applied § 103 and found both the '798 patent and the '811
patent invalid. Id. at 4-5. The Court noted that there had been a conflict
between the Fifth and Eighth Circuits over the validity of the '798 patent. The
Fifth Circuit found the patent valid because it produced an advantageous result
with less expense. The Eighth Circuit found the patent invalid because the
combination of old mechanical elements that comprised the device failed to
create a new result. Id. The Graham Court concluded that both of these
circuits had applied the wrong test. Id. at 4.
46. Id. at 17. In reaching its decision that § 103 was a codification of the
judicial invention standard, the Court relied on the legislative history of the
Act. Id. at 12-17. For a discussion of this legislative history, see note 43 supra.
The Court also concluded that § 103 was not intended to lower the standard
of patentability. 383 U.S. at 17. One commentator, however, has argued that
§ 103 rejected the rigorous patentability standards set by Great Atlantic. See
Note, supra note 26, at 1048 n.39.
47. 383 U.S. at 17-18. The Court applied these factors in its analysis of
the validity of the patent for the vibrating plow shank clamp. The Court
first outlined the extent of the prior art by noting that five prior patents had
been cited by the Patent Office in the prosecution of the '798 application.
Id. at 22. It also noted that the defendants claimed that the prior art was
established by four of these patents as well as by ten other patents and two
prior-use spring clamp arrangements that were not of record in the '798 file
wrapper. Id. The Court then compared the '798 patent to the '811 patent
that had previously been issued to the plaintiff. See note 45 supra. It concluded that Graham's two patents were similar in all respects but two: 1) in
the '798 patent, there was a stirrup and the hinge plate was bolted to the shank,
and 2) the position of the shank and the hinge plate was reversed. 383 U.S.
at 22. Graham claimed that the interchanging of the shank and hinge plate
created an effect that was not disclosed in the prior art because it allowed the
entire length of the shank to vibrate when under stress. Id. at 23. The Court,
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commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, and the failure of
48
others to produce the invention that is the subject of the patent.
Neither section 103 nor Graham set forth any special test for combination patents. 49 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has, in two postGraham decisions, referred to the test enunciated in Great Atlantic that
a combination patent should display a synergistic effect.5 0 In Anderson's-

Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.,8 1 the Court held that a patent
for a device that combined a radiant heater with a standard bituminous
paver to produce a means for treating bituminous pavement was invalid
for obviousness. 52 The Court decided the issue of patentability on the
basis of section 103 and Graham,53 but it noted that the claimant had
not argued that the combination of old elements created a synergistic
effect.54 Similarly, in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,55 the Supreme Court held
however, rejected the plaintiff's argument that this was a nonobvious patentable
invention:
We assume that the prior art does not disclose such an arrangement
as the petitioner claims in patent '798. Still we do not believe that
the argument on which petitioner's contention is bottomed supports
the validity of the patent. The tendency of the shank to flex is the
same in all cases. If free-flexing, as petitioner now argues, is the
crucial difference above the prior art, then it appears evident that the
desired result would be obtainable by not boxing the shank within
the confines of the hinge. The only other effective place available in
the arrangement was to attach it below the hinge plate and run it
through a stirrup or bracket that would not disturb its flexing qualities. Certainly a person having ordinary skill in the art, given the
fact that the flex in the shank could be utilized more effectively if
allowed to run the entire length of the shank, would immediately see
that the thing to do was what Graham did, i.e., invert the shank and
hinge plate.
Id. at 24-25.
48. 383 U.S. at 17-18. In its analysis of Graham's '798 patent, the Court
did not consider these secondary considerations. See id. at 19-26.
49. See Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 912 n.22 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 961 (1961) (there is no statutory basis for "treating the patentability of 'combination' inventions differently in law from the patentability of
some other type of invention undescribed and undefined").
50. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
51. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
52. Id. at 59, 62-63. The Court concluded that the "combination was
reasonably obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art." Id. at 60.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 59. Specifically, the Court observed that a "combination of elements may result in an effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken
separately. No such synergistic result is argued here." Id. at 61. The Court
also cited the requirement articulated in pre-1952 cases that a combination
patent must display a "new or different function to be valid." Id. at 60-61,
citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. at 147.
55. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
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a patent for a water flush system that removed animal wastes from a
barn floor invalid for obviousness 56 after analyzing the prior art as required by Graham.5 7 The Court, however, cited Great Atlantic in support of its statement that a combination patent should be scrutinized
with special care.58 It also noted, in response to the court of appeals'
finding of patent validity, that the water flush system displayed no
synergistic effect. 59
The federal courts of appeals have split on the issue of whether
Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida require a showing of synergism before a combination patent will be upheld. 60 The Fifth 61 and the Eighth
56. Id. at 274.

57. Id. As part of its analysis of the prior art, the Court reached back to
ancient mythology and examined the labors of Hercules to support its conclusion that "systems using flowing water to clean animal wastes from barn floors
have been familiar on dairy farms since ancient times." Id. at 275 n.l.
58. Id. at 281.
59. Id. at 282. The substantive history of Sakraida may offer some insight
regarding the Supreme Court's discussion of synergism. The Fifth Circuit's
decision that the water flush system patent was valid rested on two conclusions.
Id. at 280-82. First, the court of appeals concluded that the district court
erred in finding the patent obvious under § 103 and under the three-pronged
Graham test. Id. at 280. Second, the Fifth Circuit found the patent valid
because it displayed synergism. Id. at 282. Immediately after stating the
Fifth Circuit's conclusions, the Court referred to synergism as follows:
We cannot agree that the combination of these old elements to
produce an abrupt release of water directly on the barn floor from
storage tanks or tools can properly be characterized as synergistic, that
is 'resulting in an effect greater than the sum of the several effects
taken separately.' Rather, this patent simply arranges old elements
with each performing the same function it had been known to perform, although perhaps producing a more striking result than in
previous combinations. Such combinations are not patentable under
standards appropriate for a combination patent.
Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
60. For general background on this split among the circuits, see Fenton,
supra note 22, at 1215-19; Note, To Determine Whether a Device That Combines Well-Known Elements None of Which Performs Any New or Different
Funetion in the Combination,Is Obvious to a Man of Ordinary Skill, A Court
Should Apply the Graham Test and Not a Synergy Test, 48 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 110, 116-17 (1979); Note, supra note 31, at 782.
61. See Whitley v. Road Corp., 624 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1980) (combination patent for a boat trailer guide and support mechanism held invalid
for obviousness under § 103 because it was "not viable as a combination patent
made up of old and known elements which are put together in such a fashion
as to produce an unexpected, unusual or synergistic result"). See also John
Zink Co. v. National Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980). In
John Zink, the Fifth Circuit stated that when a patent involves a combination
of elements known in the prior art, "[t]he combined elements must perform a
new or different function, produce 'unusual or surprising consequences,' or
cause a synergistic result." Id. at 551, quoting Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. at 152. Although the Fifth Circuit quoted
this synergism language with approval, it found a combination patent for a
flare stack gas burner to be valid only after an extensive analysis of the prior
art which supported its holding that this patent "would not have been obvious
to one skilled in the art at the time of the invention." 613 F.2d at 555. After
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have adopted the synergism standard when analyzing the

validity of combination patents, but these circuits have not specified
whether synergism is an alternative or a supplemental test to Graham
for determining patent validity.3 The Seventh Circuit emphatically
rejected the synergism test in Republic Industries, Inc. v. Schlage Lock
Co., 4 and that decision has been followed by the Second 65 and Tenth
its analysis of the prior art, the Fifth Circuit did not specifically report any
synergistic effects of the patent at issue. See id. at 554-55. It is therefore
unclear whether synergism is an alternative or a supplemental test for obviousness in the Fifth Circuit.
62. See Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1979)
(combination patents for circular irrigation ditch held invalid for obviousness).
Although in Reinke the court analyzed the prior art extensively in accordance
with Graham, it noted that "if the claims cover a structure that combines old
and well known elements, one of the factors this court must look for in determining whether the patents meet section 103 requirements is synergism." Id.
at 648. The Reinke court thus suggested that synergism is a supplemental
test to the Graham test.
63. See notes 61 & 62 supra.
64. 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979). In Republic Industries, the court found
a patent for a fire door closer invalid because it was clearly obvious in light
of the prior art. In rejecting the synergism standard, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that:
Neither Sakraida nor Black Rock can be cited as prescribing some
other, special test for the evaluation of combination claims. Nowhere
in these two decisions did the Court hold a synergistic effect to be a
necessary condition of patentability; nor did it hold that to (sic)
synergism supersedes a finding of nonobviousness under the Graham
analysis. To the contrary, each case quoted Graham with approval.
Id. at 969. The court supported its conclusion regarding the synergism test
with at least five arguments: 1) since nearly all mechanical devices consist of a
combination of old elements, nothing would be patentable; 2) synergism has
proven to be a particularly elusive term to define; 3) in a literal sense, synergism can never exist in mechanical inventions if synergism is defined as meaning the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; 4) in enacting § 103, Congress
established nonobviousness and not synergism as the test for patentability; and
5) while synergism focuses on the result of a combination, § 103 requires that
the obviousness of an invention be determined "at the time invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art." Id. at 969-71. Although
the Seventh Circuit unambiguously rejected synergism in Republic Industries,
it is unclear whether it also decided that combination patents should no longer
be subject to special scrutiny by the courts. See id. at 972 n.25. The court
indicated that neither Sakraida nor Black Rock could be interpreted as setting
special standards for combination claims, but the court also stated that it would
maintain the high standard of patentability set forth in Black Rock. Moreover, it quoted with approval the language of the Supreme Court that "courts
should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care proportionate to the
difficulty and improbability of finding [a patentable] invention in an assembly
of old elements." Id. at 972 n.25, quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. at 152.
65. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980) (citing Republic Industries in
support of its statement that Sakraida did not overrule the statutory test for
nonobviousness established by § 103 and interpreted by Graham).
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Circuits. 6 The decisions of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have been
7
ambiguous in their stances towards the synergism test.1
68
The Third Circuit's position on synergism has also lacked clarity.
In an early interpretation of section 103, the Third Circuit, in R.M.
Palmer Co. v. Ludens, Inc., 9 analyzed design combination patents for
70
After only a cursory survey of
four fanciful chocolate animal molds.
the prior art, the court focused on the result of the combination and
found the patents valid and nonobvious, since the patentee had created
"a pleasing impression and substantially different aesthetic effect." 71
In subsequent combination patent cases, the Third Circuit and district
courts within the circuit continued to analyze the prior art as required
72
by section 103 and Graham, but frequently supplemented these criteria
66. See Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Okla., Inc., 607
F.2d 885, 904-05 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1010 (1980) (the
Supreme Court in Graham did "not require that, for a combination of known
elements to be nonobvious, the result achieved by the combination must be
synergistic").
67. See Smith v. Acme Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1980). In
Smith, the Sixth Circuit attempted to reconcile synergism with the Graham
test:
We agree that definitional deficiencies, theoretical flaws and judicial application of synergism have contributed to muddy the patent
waters. It seems apparent from the Black Rock and Sakraida decisions that the Supreme Court has recognized synergism to a limited
extent as a term symbolizing the more stringent standard for combination patent claims. . . . Unquestionably this standard was not meant
to reduce emphasis on the Graham analysis for obviousness under
§ 103. If we understood synergism to require such, synergism would
be tossed aside immediately. Rather, it is merely a symbolic reminder
of what constitutes nonobviousness when a combination patent is at
issue.
Id. at 1095.
For the Ninth Circuit's position on synergism, see Palmer v. Orthokinetics,
Inc., 611 F.2d 316, 324 n.17 (9th Cir. 1980) ("without rejecting the 'synergism
test,' we conclude that a Graham analysis is necessary in this case").
68. See notes 69-77 and accompanying text infra.
69. 236 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1956).
70. Id. at 497. The plaintiff's design patents were for molds to make
chocolate rabbits, ducks, squirrels and lambs. Id. Unlike the traditional
realistic forms, the plaintiff's molds produced animals with exaggerated features that were "ornamental caricatures." Id.
71. Id. at 501.
72. See, e.g., United States Expansion Bolt Co. v. Jordan Indust., Inc., 488
F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1973); Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kidde 9: Co., 462 F.2d
1265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972); Novelart Mfg. Co. v. Carlin
Container Corp., 363 F. Supp. 58 (D.N.J. 1973); Allen-Bradley Co. v. Air
Reduction Co., 273 F. Supp. 930 (W.D Pa. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 391 F.2d
282 (3d Cir. 1968). Three lines of analysis concerning combination patents
have emerged in the Third Circuit. In one line of cases, the district courts and
the Third Circuit have employed synergistic language to suggest that combination patents should be held to a higher standard without expressly holding
that the synergism standard should apply. See note 73 infra. In a second,
more ambiguous line of cases, courts in the Third Circuit have stated that the
tripartite Graham analysis was the accepted test for nonobviousness under § 103,
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with statements that combination patents should be held to stricter
standards 73 or with synergistic phraseology. 74 In a recent combination
patent case, Sims v. Mack Truck Corp.,7 5 the Third Circuit expressed
its reluctance to commit itself on the synergism issue. 7 6 In applying the
Graham test to invalidate a patent for a front discharge concrete mixer,
the court nonetheless suggested that a combination patent should be
77
subjected to special scrutiny.
Against this background, the Third Circuit in Rengo forthrightly
addressed the issue of whether a combination patent must display a
synergistic effect to be valid.78 In its analysis, the Third Circuit focused
on the statutory requirements for patentability, Supreme Court prece70
dent and the policy underlying patent law.
First, the court noted that in amending the patent laws of 1952,
Congress imparted to the invention requirement the new rubric of
nonobviousness.80 The court emphasized that in an effort to achieve
but these courts have also referred specifically to the synergism test, thereby
suggesting that it might be an alternative or a supplement to the Graham
test. See note 74 infra. Finally, in a case involving a design patent for a
tudor style lighting fixture, the Third Circuit specifically identified the higher
standard for combination patents as the synergism test. See Hadco Prods., Inc.
v. Walter Kidde S:Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1269-70 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1023 (1972).
73. See Gould-National Batteries, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 361 F.2d
912, 915 (3d Cir. 1966) (finding a patent for an electrolytic cell invalid since,
as an aggregation of known elements performing no new functions, it did not
"meet the rigid test of patentability"); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Knapp-Monarch
Co., 307 F.2d 344, 347 (3d Cir. 1962) (noting that mere aggregations of old
elements that perform no new functions "do not meet the rigid test of patentable invention"); Aluminum Co. v. Amerola Prods. Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1352,
1357 (W.D. Pa. 1976), afl'd, 552 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1977) (a combination patent
is invalid if it is a mere "aggregation of old elements assembled with only
mechanical skill"); Leesona Corp. v. Seigle, 281 F. Supp. 575, 578 (E.D. Pa.
1968) (in order for a combination patent to be valid, "the elements of combination must have some new functional relationship, accomplishing a new
and not readily anticipated result").
74. See United States Expansion Bolt Co. v. Jordan Indus., Inc., 488 F.2d
566, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1973) (Supreme Court has stated that a patent may be
valid if it creates a synergistic effect, but the patent at issue did not display
synergism). See also Novelart Mfg. Co. v. Carlin Container Corp., 363 F.
Supp. 58, 73 (D.N.J. 1973) (patent at issue created no synergistic effect).
75. 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980).
76. 608 F.2d at 93. The court concluded that "[iun view of our holding
that the patent at issue fails to meet the test for obviousness set down by
Graham, we need not rule on the question whether a finding of synergism is
a precondition to validity in all such cases." Id. (footnote omitted). The court
also noted that the circuit courts were split on this issue and that there was
language in recent Supreme Court decisions "suggesting that combination
patents, to be valid, must produce a synergistic effect." Id.
77. Id. at 90-91, 93.
78. 657 F.2d at 536-37.
79. Id. at 540-47. See notes 80-95 and accompanying text infra.
80. 657 F.2d at 542. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
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uniformity, Congress intended that the single standard of nonobviousness apply to all patent applications. 8'
Turning to recent Supreme Court decisions, the court concluded
that Graham 82 had established the basic factual inquiries for deciding
whether a claimed invention is obvious.83 According to the Rengo
court, Graham imposed a unitary standard for patent evaluation and
abolished the negative rules of invention.8 4 Moreover, the court stated
that Graham explicitly rejected the requirement that a valid patent must
reveal "a new or different result." 85
In analyzing more recent Supreme Court cases, the Third Circuit
conceded that the Supreme Court had invoked pre-1952 language in
Anderson's-Black Rock and in Sakraida.8 6 While noting that both of
these decisions discussed whether the patents at issue displayed a synergistic result,8 7 the Rengo court stressed that the Supreme Court's findings

of patent invalidity in both cases hinged on a Graham analysis of the
prior art.88 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the primacy of the
Graham test was unaffected by Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida.89
The court did state, however, that while Anderson's-Black Rock and
Sakraida "do not compel adoption of a synergism requirement, neither
do these decisions by their terms preclude such a result." 9o
81. 657 F.2d at 541, 544, citing S. REP. No. 1979, supra note 21; 1951
Hearings, supra note 21.

82. For a discussion of Graham, see notes 45-49 and accompanying text
supra.

83. 657 F.2d at 542-44.
84. Id. at 542. The Rengo court noted that in Graham the Supreme
Court had examined the conflicting approaches of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in evaluating the validity of a combination patent. Id. While the Fifth
Circuit had concluded that if the invention produced the same result in a
cheaper manner it was patentable, the Eighth Circuit had required a "new or
different" result before a patent should be granted. Id. In Graham, the Third
Circuit concluded, the Supreme Court rejected both of these approaches by
directing "that courts should inquire solely into whether the improvement
in question would have been obvious to one skilled in the art." Id.
85. 657 F.2d at 542-43.
86. Id. at 543. The Rengo court observed that "[n]otwithstanding Graham,
the Supreme Court, in two more recent decisions, has resorted to language
which evokes the rule of Hicks v. Kelsey and A &rP Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Corp." Id.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 543-44. The court emphasized that although there may have
been references to synergism in Black Rock, the Supreme Court actually applied the Graham test and thereby reaffirmed its principles. Id. at 543. For
a discussion of the Graham analysis in Black Rock and Sakraida, see notes
53 & 57 and accompanying text supra. In explaining the Sakraida decision,
the Third Circuit suggested that the Supreme Court had employed synergistic
language only as a response to the Fifth Circuit's holding that the combination
patent was valid because it displayed synergism. 657 F.2d at 543-44. The
Seventh Circuit expressed a similar view in Republic Industries. See note 64
supra.
89. 657 F.2d at 543-44.

90. Id. at 544.
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The Third Circuit buttressed its rejection of the synergism test with
many of the policy considerations that the Seventh Circuit had emphasized in Republic Industries91 and maintained that the synergism test
should be abandoned as an analytically imprecise standard. 92 Finally,
the Third Circuit endorsed the Seventh Circuit's view that a synergism
standard incorrectly stresses the result of a combination rather than the
creation of a combination. 93 The Rengo court therefore held that
synergism was not a prerequisite for a valid combination patent, 94 and
that a combination patent should be judged by the same standards as
any other patent. 95
91. Id. at 544-46. For a discussion of these policy concerns, see note 64
supra. Citing Judge Learned Hand's opinion in 1935, the Rengo court pointed
out that while synergism is presumably a characteristic of combination patents,
it is often difficult to distinguish a combination patent from other patents since
every invention is a combination of old elements. Id. at 545. Judge Hand,
in a frequently cited passage, observed that
All machines are made up of the same elements; rods, pawls, pitmans,
journals, toggles, gears, cams, and the like, all acting their parts as
they always do and always must. All compositions are made of the
same substances, retaining their fixed chemical properties. But the
elements are capable of an infinity of permutations, and the selection
of that group which proves serviceable to a given need may require
a high degree of originality. It is that act of selection which is the
"invention" and it must be beyond the capacity of common-place
imagination.
B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde &cCo., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1935).
On a more empirical level, the Third Circuit maintained that synergism
can rarely, if ever, occur in a mechanical patent. 657 F.2d at 545. Therefore,
the court concluded, virtually all mechanical combinations would be unpatentable if courts required synergism. Id.
92. 657 F.2d at 544-45. The court emphasized that the term synergism
has been notoriously difficult for courts to define or to apply consistently. Id.
at 544 n.20.
93. Id. at 545-46. The Rengo court emphasizes that under § 103 courts
should focus on whether the decision to combine certain elements was obvious
at the time of invention. Id. It concluded that the synergism test, in contrast, improperly highlighted the result of the combination by focusing on the
performance of the elements in combination. Id.
94. Id. at 546. The Rengo court stated:
Because the synergism requirement is neither mandated by the
Supreme Court nor commended by independent consideration, we
decline to adopt it as a prerequisite to the validity of a combination
patent. Instead, we regard the three-part test of Graham as applicable
to combination, as well as to other patents: to ascertain the nonobviousness of a patent, a court should look to the prior art, to the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, and to
the level of skill in the industry, with appropriate weight accorded to
"secondary considerations."

Id.
95. Id. The court noted that "[i]n contrast to the district court, we doubt
that the Supreme Court's recent decisions impose distinctive barriers to the
validity of combination patents." Id. at 544 (footnote omitted). Judge Adams
suggested that the mere use of "synergistic aphorisms" would not have been
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Judge Dumbauld concurred with the disposition of the case, although he indicated that he would have been willing to affirm the
district court's holding on the patent validity issue, since he characterized the district court's references to synergism as more rhetorical than
substantive. 96 Moreover, he stated that he would have been "content to
continue the present ambiguous stance" with regard to synergism rather
than joining those circuits that had rejected synergism.9 7
It is submitted that in rejecting synergism, the Rengo court was
ultimately persuaded by the cogent argument of the Seventh Circuit in
Republic Industries98 that synergism is neither mandated by statute nor
reversible error but that the district court in Rengo had erred in its sporadic
substitution of synergism for the Graham test. Id. at 546.
An additional but related issue considered by the Rengo court was whether
Rengo's Japanese patent application should be accorded priority. Id. at 54750. This issue is linked to the obviousness issue because courts generally analyze
the obviousness of an invention within the context of the state of the art at
the time the patent application was filed with the patent office. Id. at 547.
The court first considered the requirements of § 119 which provides in relevant
part:
An application for patent for an invention filed in this country
by any person who has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have,
previously regularly filed an application for a patent for the same
invention in a foreign country which affords similar privileges in the
case of applications filed in the United States or to citizens of the
United States, shall have the same effect as the same application
would have if filed in this country on the date on which the application for patent for the same invention was first filed in such foreign
country, if the application in this country is filed within twelve months
from the earliest date on which such foreign application was filed.
35 U.S.C. § 119 (1976).
The court then analyzed the provisions of § 112 which provides in relevant
part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Id. § 112.

Finally, the court held that § 119 incorporates the requirements of § 112
for a valid patent application. 657 F.2d at 548. The court reasoned that if
a foreign application did not have to meet the requirements of § 112, an inventor could file a foreign application for an unperfected invention and use
the remaining year to perfect the invention before he had to file an American
application. Id. The Third Circuit therefore stated that an inventor could
claim his foreign application as the basis for an analysis of the obviousness of
his invention only if the foreign application satisfies the enablement requirement of § 112. Id. at 548-50. Because Rengo's Japanese patent satisfied
these requirements, the court concluded that Rengo could assert its Japanese
filing date. Id.
96. 657 F.2d at 553 (Dumbauld, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. For a discussion of Republic Industries, see note 64 and accompanying
text supra. Not only did both courts reach the same conclusions, but the rationale of Rengo paralleled that of the Seventh Circuit in Republic Industries.
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by Supreme Court precedent.09 In interpreting section 103, Judge
Adams carefully noted that the synergism standard, with its focus on the
result of the combination, appeared inconsistent with the statutory determination of a combination's obviousness at the time of invention. 1 °
In addition, it is suggested that Judge Adams correctly emphasized that
the analytical defects of the synergism test encouraged inconsistent application of the patent laws,10' a conclusion that is amply supported by
even a cursory analysis of the numerous decisions by courts in the Third
Circuit that have blended synergistic phraseology with a Graham
102
analysis.
While the Third Circuit reached a sound conclusion in rejecting
synergism, 103 the court's analysis of the district court's decision in Rengo
suffered from a lack of clarity that may create further confusion. The
Rengo court characterized the district court's analysis in three ways: 1)
the Third Circuit stated that the district court applied the Graham
test; 104 2) it suggested that the district court "supplemented" its Graham
analysis with a synergistic analysis; '05 and 3) it concluded that the
district court sporadically "substituted" synergism for a Graham analysis. 106

Although the Third Circuit stated that the district court erred

0 7
to the extent that it deviated from Graham,1
it is submitted that these
varying characterizations of the district court's analysis obfuscate the
precise nature of that deviation. This lack of clarity is particularly
troublesome since the district court found the patent invalid for obviousness after a detailed, painstaking analysis of the prior art, the difference
between that art and the '502 patent, and the level of skill in that art as
required by Graham.l0o Admittedly, the lower court supplemented this

99. 657 F.2d at 542-43, 545, 546.
100. See 657 F.2d at 545. For the text of § 103, see note 43 supra. Judge
Adams perceptively buttressed this conclusion with the insight of Learned
Hand that "it is the art of selection which is the 'invention' " rather than the
results of the combination. 657 F.2d at 545, citing B.G. Corp. v. Walter
Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1935). For a more complete quotation
of this influential observation by Learned Hand, see note 91 supra.
101. See 657 F.2d at 544-45.
102. For a discussion of the varied analyses of patent validity by courts
in the Third Circuit, see notes 69-77 and accompanying text supra.
103. See 657 F.2d at 546. It is submitted that the Rengo court engaged
in a thorough analysis of the ramifications of a synergistic approach and provided compelling reasons for rejecting the synergism test. See id. at 540-46.
104. Id. at 542. The court stated: "In the case at hand, the district court
adhered to the Graham decision by identifying the scope of the prior art, the
difference between the art and the '502 patent, and the relevant level of skill."
Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 546.
107. Id.
108. For a discussion of the district court's analysis, see note 16 supra.
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analysis with synergistic verbiage, 109 but the Rengo court adopted a permissive view of "synergistic aphorisms," suggesting that the use of these
aphorisms, alone, would not require reversal. 110
Perhaps even more disturbing than the Rengo court's lack of precision in explaining the district court's error was the implication that a
Graham analysis may be inadequate without an extremely detailed explanation of why the combination of elements was obvious."' Specifically, the Rengo court criticized the district court for its failure to
develop an adequate explanation of why the placement of the diverter
plate between the rotary shear and the slitter-scorer unit was obvious to
one skilled in the art at the time of the invention. 12 Upon close examination, however, it can be seen that the district court carefully analyzed
the level of skill in this particular industry and concluded that because
it was so high, 1 the arrangement of the diverter plate before the slitterscorer unit was obvious. 1 4 This explanation seems at least as substan109. See Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., No. 78-2000, slip op. at 31 (D.N.J.
July 31, 1980) (blending Graham prior art analysis with synergistic language to
explain why the placement of the diverter plate was obvious).
110. 657 F.2d at 546. Although the court clearly stated that it declined
to adopt the synergism standard "as a prerequisite to the validity of a combination patent," it tempered its rejection of synergism by suggesting that "a
mere reference to synergistic aphorisms" by the district court would not have
necessitated reversal of its determination that the '502 patent was invalid. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., No. 78-2000, slip op. at 22-23 (D.N.J.
July 31, 1980) (the level of skill in the art of designing corrugator machinery
was "very high" since the typical designer had a degree in engineering, three
years experience in designing precision machinery for manufacturing paperboard
and three years experience in designing pneumatic, hydraulic and electrical
system). Id. slip op. at 22.
114. Id. slip op. at 29-30. The extent of the district court's analysis can
best be illustrated through the following statement:
In summary, although the prior art does not teach the placement
of a diverter plate upstream of the cutting and grooving tools for diverting the web to either of two vertically disposed slitter-scorer units,
it does teach: (1)the alternative use of two slitting and scoring devices
whether arranged in tandem or in some vertical fashion; (2) the vertical arrangement of other component parts of corrugators (e.g. cut-off
machine); (3) a diverter mechanism extending from the inlet of the
slitter-scorers .... I find that the difference between the prior art and
the claims in suit would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art in 1972, as that term has previously been defined.
Each element of the combination performs in the same manner and
with the same result as in the prior art machines. The placement of
the diverter plate between the rotary shear and the slitter-scorer units,
while having no identical antecedent in 'the art, would not have been
an unobvious concept to a person possessing the high level of skill
in the pertinent art.

Id. (emphasis added).
Although the district court included synergistic language in its analysis of

obviousness when it noted that "each element of the combination" functioned
in the "same manner" as in prior machines, it explained the obviousness in
terms of the prior art as required by Graham.
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tial as the one advanced by the Supreme Court in Graham when it
invalidated a patent on a clamp for vibrating plow shanks because of
obviousness. 115 Since the Rengo court failed to give a concrete example
of the kind of explanation that would suffice, it appears to have adopted
a higher level of scrutiny for obviousness without providing any guidelines for its future application.
Despite these potential sources of confusion, Rengo has significantly
clarified the Third Circuit's position on the determination of patent
validity not only by rejecting synergism but also by suggesting that combination patents should not be subjected to a special test. 1 6 By clearly
mandating a uniform test for all patents, it has taken a step beyond the
precedents set by the Supreme Court 117 and perhaps by the Seventh
Circuit."18 Although the Seventh Circuit was the first circuit to reject
synergism, the Republic Industries decision seemed to suggest that combination patents should still be subjected to special scrutiny."19 The
Rengo court, in contrast, suggested that there should be no special
120
criteria of patentability for a combination patent.
The most obvious impact of the Rengo decision is that it will encourage the application of a consistent nonobviousness analysis under
section 103 in place of the ambivalence that has pervaded Third Circuit
opinions on this issue in the past. 2t Admittedly, the factual inquiries
115. For a discussion of the Court's application of the principles of Graham
to the facts of that case, see notes 45 &47 supra.
116. 657 F.2d at 544 &c546.
117. See 425 U.S. at 281. In Sakraida, for instance, the Supreme Court
cited language from Great Atlantic that combination patents should be scrutinized with a special care "proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of
finding invention in an assembly of old elements." Id., citing Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip Co., 340 U.S. at 152.
118. See note 64 supra.

119. See 592 F.2d at 972. The Seventh Circuit's position on whether combination patents should be subjected to special scrutiny remains unclear. In
Republic Industries, there is language that a uniform standard should be
applied when analyzing combination patents. See note 64 supra. In addition,
however, the Seventh Circuit quoted with approval the Supreme Court's state-

ment in Great Atlantic that combination patents should be scrutinized with
special care. Id. at 972 n.25.

120. 657 F.2d at 544, 546. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
But cf. Smith v. Acme Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d 1086, 1095 (6th Cir. 1980) (recent
Supreme Court decisions suggest that combination patents be subjected to
special scrutiny). In Smith, the Sixth Circuit apparently retreated from its
earlier position that "[n]o statutory warrant appears, therefore, for treating the
patentability of 'combination' inventions differently in law from the patentability of some other type of invention undescribed and undefined." Nickola v.
Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 912 n.22 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961
(1979).
121. See notes 69-77 and accompanying text supra. A desire to encourage
"the development of a consistent predictable body of law under section 103"

was one of the factors that induced the Seventh Circuit to reject synergism.
Republic Indus., Inc., 592 F.2d at 972.
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122
mandated by Graham are not always straightforward and objective,
but the tripartite analysis required by Graham provides more guidance
for future determinations of patent validity than is offered by the vague
notion of synergism. 123 Because the Graham test has been applied by
numerous courts since 1966, there is a substantial body of case law to
24
which courts can look for guidance.
The Rengo decision should also have the practical effect of making
it easier for combination patents to withstand a validity challenge in
the Third Circuit. 125 This, in turn, should offer some incentive for
inventors to make their inventions public rather than conceal them as
trade secrets. 126 Finally, if the Rengo decision inspires other circuits to
reject synergism, thus leaving Graham as the sole test of nonobviousness
throughout the circuits, forum shopping by those involved in patent
27
litigation may be discouraged.

Nancy G. Eshelman
122. The Third Circuit recently acknowledged the difficulty of applying
the third prong of the Graham test. See Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 608 F.2d 87,
92 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980). See also Crossan, Patent
Law: Synergism Rejected, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 339, 348 (1980) (noting that
one of the ambiguities of the Graham test is the weight courts should give to
its secondary considerations).
123. For the elements of the Graham analysis, see notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
124. See Crossan, supra note 122, at 348.
125. See Note, supra note 28, at 169.
126. See Note, supra note 60, at 117 (uncertain standards and a "widespread perception that most courts possess an anti-patent bias" have induced
some inventors to conceal their inventions as trade secrets rather than patenting
them).
127. Id. The author suggests that forum shopping in patent litigation has
been encouraged by the differing views among the circuits on the definition
and application of synergism. Id.
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CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964-TITLE VI-A SHOWING OF DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS ALONE

IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE

VIOLATION OF TITLE VI, BUT ULTIMATE BURDEN OF PROOF REMAINS

ON THE PLAINTIFF.
NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc. (1981)
The Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. (WMC) 1 located in Wilmington, Delaware, devised a reorganization plan, Plan Omega, in
order to resolve the serious problems facing it.2 Plan Omega consisted of the relocation and consolidation of WMC's facilities, which
decreased the Center's accessibility to various minority groups. 3 Black,
Puerto Rican, and handicapped individuals, and groups representing
them,4 filed suit charging that Plan Omega was intentionally discriminatory, and that, if implemented, would create a disparate, adverse
1. 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981). The WMC was organized in 1965 by the
merger of three nonprofit hospitals located in different areas of Wilmington.
Id. at 1324. The WMC provides general medical and surgical services in addition to secondary and tertiary hospital care. Id.
2. Id. at 1325. Due to the age of WMC's physical structures and their resulting noncompliance with Delaware's licensing law, WMC was confronted
with many problems, the most serious of which was the possible loss of accreditation. Id. Loss of accreditation would have been financially disastrous, as it
would have resulted in WMC being denied Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. Id. Because WMC provides the largest amount of unreimbursed
medical care in the country, its financial problems were already severe. Id.
The population shift from the City of Wilmington to the southwestern
suburbs, along with the potential establishment of another health care facility,
posed additional problems for WMC. Id. If a competitor were established,
WMC would lose the patronage of the suburban residents, most of whom either
pay for their services or are insured. Id.
Acknowledging the need for remedial action, the board of WMC considered
its options and, after studying approximately 50 plans for relocation and consolidation, chose the "Plan Omega." Id.
3. Id. Specifically, Plan Omega proposed to close General and Memorial
hospitals in downtown Wilmington, renovate a third city facility (the Delaware
hospital), and build a new hospital in the southwest suburbs of Wilmington.
Id.
4. NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del.
1980). This action is the most recent in a series of suits by the plaintiffs against
the WMC. 657 F.2d at 1324. For the history of the prior litigation, see
Wilmington United Neighborhoods v. H.E.W., 458 F. Supp. 628 (D. Del. 1978),
afl'd, 615 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1980); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,
453 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1978); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,
453 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd in part, 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979)
(noted at 25 VILL. L. REV. 1021 (1980)); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center,
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Del. 1977), afl'd, 584 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1978); NAACP
v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977).

(797)
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impact on minorities, the handicapped and the elderly. 5 The plaintiffs
maintained that Plan Omega violated Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,6 and sought an injunction against the proposed relocation
and reorganization of WMC. 7

The defendant claimed that Plan Omega

would improve service, prevent the loss of accreditation, and preserve
the patronage of suburban residents who were more likely to pay for
services. s WMC also claimed that discriminatory intent was necessary
to state a cause of action under Title VI and that no such intent was
present. 9
The district court concluded that there was no discrimination
violative of Title VI and entered judgment for the defendant. 10 The
5. 657 F.2d at 1324. Plan Omega would reduce Wilmington's hospital beds
from 1,104 to 250, while adding 780 hospital beds in the suburbs. Id. This
allocation of beds was alleged to be discriminatory, since the classes of persons
represented by plaintiffs lived predominantly in Wilmington. NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 4.91 F. Supp. 290, 302-08 (D. Del. 1980). The
WMC offered to provide shuttle service between the city and suburban facilities,
but the plaintiffs contended that Plan Omega would still subject them to inferior health care and disproportionate travel burdens. 657 F.2d at 1325-26.
6. 657 F.2d at 1324. Title VI is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
Section 2000d provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance." Id. For a further discussion of Title VI,
see notes 14-16 and accompanying text infra. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Age Discrimination Act. 657 F.2d
at 1324. The Rehabilitation Act of 1975, provides in pertinent part: "No
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States .... shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. II 1978). The
Age Discrimination Act states: "no person in the United States shall, on the
basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under, any programs or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1976 9c Supp. II 1978). The original
complaint did not allege that the Age Discrimination Act was violated, but was
amended to include that allegation. 657 F.2d at 1324.
7. 657 F.2d at 1324.
8. Id. at 1325.
9. NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 311 (D.
Del. 1980). The plaintiff charged both intentional discrimination and disparate
impact. Id. at 310.
10. Id. at 345. The district court found that the plaintiff could not prevail
under either the intent or the disparate impact theory. Id. at 313-14. In a
disparate impact case, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory effect, after which
the burden shifts to the defendant to show that he took the action for a valid
business reason. Id. at 314-15. The plaintiff can rebut a valid business justification by showing that a feasible alternative which is less discriminatory
exists. Id. In the Wilmington Medical Center case, the plaintiffs failed to show
that a feasible alternative to Plan Omega was available, and the defendant's
business justification was unrebutted. Id. at 343. Consequently, Plan Omega
was found not to be violative of Title VI and judgment was entered for the
defendant WMC. Id. at 345.
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2
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 11 affirmed,'
holding that proof of disparate impact is sufficient to establish a prima
facie violation of Title VI, and that the ultimate burden of persuasion
was on the plaintiffs who had failed to meet their burden of proof.
NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act) was enacted "to provide a more
effective means of enforcing civil rights and prohibiting discrimination." 1 Title VI of the Act prohibits "discrimination" in any program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 14 Although there is
evidence that Title VI was designed to address more than just intentional
discrimination,' 5 Congress did not include an exact definition of "discrimination" nor a statement of its scope in the Act. 16
The first Supreme Court decision dealing with the question of
what constitutes a prima facie violation of Title VI was Jefferson v.
Hackney.' 7 In Jefferson, the plaintiffs challenged Texas' system of allocating welfare payments which indirectly resulted in minority groups
getting smaller grants than nonminority groups.'s The Court found

11. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Gibbons and Weis, and District
Judge Bechtle. The case was reargued on May 11, 1981 before Circuit Judges
Aldisert, Adams, Gibbons, Hunter, Weis, Garth, Higginbotham and Sloviter.
Judge Weis wrote the opinion of the court. Judge Adams concurred and
Judge Gibbons dissented in part.
12. 657 F.2d at 1331, 1338. The court assumed, arguendo, that the plain-

tiffs had established a prima facie case.

Id. at 1332-33.

13. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 999, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
& AD. NEWs 2391-92.

CODE CONG.

14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). For the text of § 2000d see note 6 supra.
The goal of prohibiting discrimination was to be achieved through a refusal to
grant or continue financial assistance to programs or activities that fail to
comply with the requirements of Title VI. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 999, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391-92.
15. See 110 CONG. REc. 6543 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). During
debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senator Humphrey repeated the language in President Kennedy's transmittal of the Civil Rights Bill to Congress:
"Simple justice requires that public funds . . . not be spent in any fashion
which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination."
Id. (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 5863 (remarks of Senators Humphrey and Eastland). The lack
of definition was an intentional attempt by Congress to make Title VI as farreaching as possible. Id. at 6546 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Senator
Humphrey thought it "wise to leave the [executive] agencies a good deal of discretion as to how they will act." Id.
17. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
18. Id. at 537-49. The Texas system gave recipients of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) a lesser percentage of their total needs than
that given to other aid recipients. Id. Since a proportionately larger number
of minority groups were AFDC recipients, minorities had a smaller percentage
of their needs met through the welfare system. Id.
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that the Texas welfare system did not violate Title VI 19 since there
was a rational relationship between the procedure for allocating money
20
and the purposes of the welfare system.
The Supreme Court found a Title VI violation based solely on
disparate impact, or disparate effects, in Lau v. Nichols.21 The plaintiffs
in Lau claimed that Chinese students in the San Francisco public schools
were unable to benefit from the schools as much as white students due
to their lack of fluency in English. 22 Although all students received the
same instruction, the plaintiffs sought relief from the "unequal educational opportunities" which the Chinese students had.23 The Court
found that the school system's policies did result in an inferior education
for the Chinese students and that this disparate effect alone, was enough
24
to constitute a Title VI violation.
19. Id. at 536-39. Minority groups (blacks and Mexican-Americans) receiving the lesser grants claimed a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. The Court found no equal protection violation.
Id. It also stated that the welfare allocation system did not violate Title VI
although the plaintiffs had not raised a Title VI claim. Id. at 549-50 n.19.
20. Id. at 549-50. The state allocated welfare payments on the basis of
the ability to bear hardships of an inadequate standard of living. Id. The
Court found this to be sufficient justification, stating that "[s]ince the Texas
procedure challenged here is related to the purposes of the welfare programs, it
is not proscribed by Title VI simply because of variances in the racial composition of the different categorical programs." Id. at 550 n.19 (emphasis supplied
by the Court).
21. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
22. Id. at 564-66. The San Francisco school district was integrated in 1971,
resulting in 2,856 students of Chinese ancestry being placed in the public schools
without the ability to speak fluent English. Id. The opportunity for these
students to take full advantage of the educational program was therefore unequal to that of the non-Chinese students. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 566-69. The Court stated that "[d]iscrimination is barred which
Id. at 569
has that effect even though no purposeful design is present .....
(emphasis by the Court).
Although a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment was also alleged, the Court stated that "[w]e ... rely solely on § 601
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, to reverse the Court of Appeals." 414 U.S. at 566. However, the Court's decision seemed to rely heavily
on Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) regulation, 45 C.F.R.
§ 80.3(b)(2), which bars actions that have a discriminatory effect even without purposeful design. See 414 U.S. at 567-68. Section 80.3(b)(2) states
that it is unlawful to "[provide any service, financial aid, or other benefit to
an individual which is different, or is provided in a different manner, from that
provided to others under the program." 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1972). This
regulation was authorized by § 602 of the Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-l. For a further discussion of the significance of these regulations, see
generally Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978).
In addition to finding a Title VI violation, the Lau Court also required the
school system to take corrective action based on an HEW clarifying guideline.
414 U.S. at 568. That guideline states in pertinent part: "Where inability to
speak and understand the English language excludes national origin-minority
group children from effective participation in the educational program offered
by a school district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language
deficiency." Id. at 568, quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1975). The case was
remanded in order to fashion appropriate relief. 414 U.S. at 569.
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The Supreme Court decisions after Lau evidenced a more restrictive
approach to discrimination claims whether based on constitutional or
statutory provisions.2 5 Although most of these cases dealt only with
constitutionally based claims grounded in due process or equal protection, 26 the Court also questioned the validity of the Lau disparate
27
impact standard for Title VI claims.
The move toward a more restrictive approach in Title VI claims
began in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 28 where the

Supreme Court held that Title VI did not permit the use of a quota
system to admit members of minority groups to medical school. 29 Al25. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 789 (1972).

26. For the Court's approach to a due process claim, see Washington v.

Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Washington, an employment test which resulted
in a disporportionate number of rejections of black applicants was found not
to be a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 233,
246-48. The Court found that a law or official act is not unconstitutional solely
because of its disparate impact. Id. at 239. An intent to discriminate on the
basis of race must be present in order to find a constitutional violation. Id. at
240. However, the Court also indicated that in some cases discriminatory intent
could be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, as in cases where the
discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. Id. at 242. The
Washington Court further commented that the legislature could always proscribe
acts which resulted in a racially disparate impact, even though such acts might
not be violative of the Constitution. Id. at 248.
In a subsequent case, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court listed examples of the types of evidence which
could be used to infer racially discriminatory intent. Id. at 266-67. These
include the historical background of the decision, departures from normal procedure, the specific sequence of events, and, in extreme cases, a clear pattern of
discrimination unexplainable by reasons other than race. Id.
27. See notes 28-42 and accompanying text infra.
28. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of Bakke, see
generally Bell, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?,
67 CALIF. L. REV. 21 (1979); Dixon, Bakke: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 67 CALIF.
L. REV. 69 (1979); Maltz, A Bakke Primer, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 119 (1979); Tribe,
Perspectives on Bakke: Equal Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural
Justice, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv.

L.

5, 131 (1978).
29. 438 U.S. at 320. The Medical School of the University of California at

REV.

Davis had a special admissions program to aid minorities and disadvantaged

persons who failed to be admitted in the regular admissions program.

Id. at

272-76. The program reserved 16 of the total 100 positions in the incoming
class for minority students. Id. at 276 n.6. The program was justified by the
medical school as a remedy for past discriminatory admissions policies. Id. at
310. Mr. Bakke twice failed to be admitted through the regular admissions
program and brought suit claiming that the special admissions program violated

the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and Title VI. Id. at

276. Justice Powell's plurality opinion stated that race can be a factor in an
admissions policy, but in this case the medical school's program was invalid
because the program was not shown to promote a substantial state interest. Id.
at 320.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, concluded that the medical school's program was a permissible means of correcting
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though the Bakke decision primarily addressed the constitutionality of
affirmative action programs which utilize quotas, the decision also cast
doubt upon the continued validity of the Lau impact standard.3 0
Four of the Justices expressed the view that disparate impact alone
would not be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VI. 3 '
Although Lau was not expressly overruled by Bakke, the question
of whether disparate impact is sufficient to create a Title VI violation
became unsettled in the wake of Bakke.3 2 For example, in Board of
Education v. Harris, decided one year after Bakke was decided, three
members of the United States Supreme Court stated that Title VI did not
contain a disparate impact standard.33 Also, some of the courts of
past discriminatory admissions policies. Id. at 353 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Stewart, and Rehnquist, did not discuss the issue of whether race
could ever be a factor in admissions policies. Id. at 411-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He did conclude, however, that the
medical school's existing policy had violated Title VI by excluding this applicant
because of his race. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
30. See id. at 284-87. See also id. at 324-54 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Brennan expressed the view that Title VI merely
extended the application of the fourteenth amendment to private parties receiving federal funds. Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This discussion of the proper interpretation of Title VI led
to a questioning of the validity of Lau:
Since we are now of the opinion, for reasons set forth above, that Title
VI's standard, applicable alike to public and private recipients of federal funds, is no broader than the Constitution's, we have serious
doubts concerning the correctness of what appears to be the premise
of [the Lau] decision.
Id. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Powell, while not questioning the vitality of Lau, gave that decision
a narrow reading, stating that "[t]he [Lau] decision rested solely on the statute
which had been construed by the responsible administrative agency to reach
educational practices 'which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination.' " Id. at 304. Justice Powell further indicated that the impact standard
may be too broad, stating that "Title VI must be held to proscribe only those
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 287.
31. Id. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Brennan stated that "Lau's implication that impact alone is in some
contexts sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VI, [is] contrary to our view that Title VI's definition of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's .... ." Id. See also note 30 supra.
Although Justice Brennan expressed doubts about the holding of Lau, he
did not state that Lau should be overruled. See generally 438 U.S. at 352-54
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. See notes 33-42 and accompanying text infra.
33. 444 U.S. 130, 160 (1979). In Harris, the Court determined that an impact standard applied to § 702(b) of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619 (1976). 444 U.S. at 149. The Court found no need to
consider Title VI in making this decision, as a Title VI violation was not alleged. Id. However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, stated that Title VI prohibits only intentional
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appeals interpreted Bakke to state that the impact standard for Title VI
was no longer valid.3 4 Citing Bakke for support, the Seventh Circuit, in
Cannon v. University of Chicago,3 5 stated that disparate impact alone
does not establish a Title VI violation.36 Similarly, a- concurring opinion in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission,3 7 a Second
Circuit case, relied on Bakke to conclude that Title VI required proof
of discriminatory intent.38
More recently, however, a plurality of the Supreme Court cited Lau
with approval in Fullilove v. Klutznick.3 9 In Fullilove, the Court
upheld the validity of Commerce Department regulations which required that ten percent of the federal funds granted for public construction projects be earmarked for minority group members. 40 A
plurality of the Court found that these regulations were necessary to
discrimination. Id. at 160 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Further, Stewart interpreted
Bakke to find that Title VI only prohibited discrimination violative of the fifth
amendment or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
The dissent reasoned that because Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
had found that the fifth and fourteenth amendments only prohibited intentional
discrimination, it followed that Title VI was likewise restricted to intentional
discrimination. 444 U.S. at 160 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
Washington, see note 26 supra.
34. For a discussion of the Second and Seventh Circuits' treatment of this
issue, see notes 35-38 and accompanying text infra.
35. 648 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1981).
36. Id. at 1106-08. The Seventh Circuit looked to Title VI for guidance
in ruling on a Title IX claim, since no cases have interpreted Title IX (which
bars sex discrimination in federally assisted educational programs). Id. at 1106.
The Seventh Circuit cited Bakke as supporting the proposition that the Supreme
Court would hold that "a violation of Title VI requires an intentional discriminatory act and that disparate impact alone is not sufficient to establish a violation." Id. at 1109.
37. 633 F.2d 232, 272 (2d Cir. 1980) (Coffrin, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 274 (Coffrin, J., concurring). In Guardians,the court reversed the
district court's finding of a Title VI violation based on disparate impact. Id.
at 254. The majority held that there was no private cause of action under
Title VI, and did not reach the question of disparate impact. Id. at 255. The
concurrence cited Bakke in support of the position that proof of discriminatory
intent is required in a Title VI case, stating that the majority of the Supreme
Court seems to take the position that a Title VI claim must meet an "intent"
standard. Id. at 274-75 (Coffrin, J., concurring).
39. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion).
40. Id. at 492. The Chief Justice wrote the plurality opinion and was
joined by Justices White and Powell. See also id. at 494 (Marshall, J., concurring). In May, 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works Employment Act
of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977). The "minority business enterprise" provision of the Public Works Employment Act, § 103(f)(2), required that
10% of the federal funds granted for local public works be set aside and used
to procure services or supplies from businesses owned and controlled by
"minority group members". 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1976 & Supp. II 1978). In
Fullilove, plaintiff construction contractors challenged the regulation as being
violative of equal protection and due process and of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act. 448 U.S. at 455.
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Lau was cited as supporting the

principle that affirmative action can be taken to correct the effects of
42
past discrimination.
The question of who bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in a
Title VI case has not been addressed to any great extent by the Supreme Court.48 However, the Court has discussed that question as
applied to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 44

In Title VII

actions the Court has held that the ultimate burden of persuasion
4

remains on the plaintiff.

5

41. 448 U.S. at 479. In upholding the regulations, the plurality opinion
stated that Congress had "abundant" evidence that past discrimination was
being perpetuated by current procurement practices, and that this denied effective participation to minority businesses in public contracting opportunities.
Id. at 477-78. The Court noted that these barriers had to be lifted to ensure
that minority businesses had equal opportunity to participate in federal grants.
Id.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, found that the "set-aside" provision was constitutional because it was
substantially related to the furtherance of important governmental objectives.
Id. at 493 (Marshall, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 478. In the discussion of Lau, Chief Justice Burger pointed out
that Lau upheld the constitutionality of federal regulations in a case in which
no discriminatory intent was present. Id. Those regulations prohibited the
use of "methods of administration which have the effect . . . of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the [educational]
programs as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin."
Id. at 479 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
43. There was some discussion of this issue in Board of Educ. v. Harris.
See 444 U.S. at 151; note 33 supra. In that case, the Court stated "We conclude, however, that the burden is on the party against whom the statistical case
has been made.... That burden perhaps could be carried by proof of 'educational necessity' analogous to the 'business necessity' justification applied under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. (citation omitted).
44. See notes 45-59 infra. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was enacted to
"eliminate discriminatory employment practices." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 999, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391,
2392. Section 703 of Title VII provides:
(a) Employer practices.
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1974).
45. See, e.g., New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1980); Board
of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978); McNeil v. McDonough, No. 80-1640 (3d Cir. April 24, 1981);
Smithers v. Boular, 629 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1980); Kundo v. Muhlenberg College,
621 F.2d 532, 543 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980); Whack v. Peabody & Wind Eng'r Co., 595
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The first Supreme Court decision addressing the burden of proof
in Title VII cases was Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 4 6 In Griggs, the
plaintiffs charged the Duke Power Company with engaging in racially
discriminatory hiring and employment practices. 47 The Court indicated that after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show a "business necessity" which
would permit the defendant to use a hiring practice which had dis48
criminatory effects.
The Court offered further guidance on the issue of the burden of
proof in Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.4 9 In
McDonnell, the Court held that after the defendant has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his actions, 50 the plaintiff
could produce evidence to show that the defendant's reason, though
valid, was only a pretext for discrimination.5 ' In Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 52 the Court narrowed the scope of the "business necessity"
F.2d 190, 193 (3d Cir. 1979). In Beazer, the Court stated explicitly that the
ultimate burden of proving a Title VII violation was on the plaintiff. 440 U.S.
at 587 n.31.
In disparate impact cases such as Griggs and Albermarle, the burden of
proof is essentially the same as in intent cases such as McDonald and Furnco.
For a discussion of burden of proof in those cases, see notes 46-59 and accompanying text infra. The Court has indicated that there are differences between
impact and intent cases. In cases where discriminatory intent is claimed, proof
of a discriminatory motive is required. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977). Proof of motive is not required,
however, in disparate impact cases. Id. Other evidence of a divergence of
treatment of impact and intent cases is found in Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981). In Burdine, the Court stated: "We
have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected classes." Id. at 1093 n.5
(citations omitted).
46. 401 U.S. 424 (1970).
47. Id. at 426-27. The plaintiffs, job applicants and employees, claimed
that the defendant's intelligence test, which was required for hiring and promotion, was racially discriminatory. Id. The question before the Court wfis
whether or not Title VII required discriminatory intent. Id. at 428.
48. Id. at 431-32. The Court held that if an employment procedure produced discriminatory effects, lack of intent to discriminate would not redeem
that procedure. Id. at 432. Instead, the employer must justify that procedure
by showing a relationship between it and job performance. Id.
49. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
50. Id. at 802. The Court held that the defendant's business need must be
a reasonable one. In a later case, the Court added that the defendant need not
prove an absence of discriminatory intent. Board of Trustees v. Sweeney,
439 U.S. 24, 24-25 (1978).
51. 411 U.S. at 804-05. The Court stated that the plaintiff must be given
a full opportunity to demonstrate that the presumably valid reason was in fact a
coverup for racial discrimination. Id. at 805. Relevant evidence includes the
defendant's general policy with respect to minority employment, and statistics
demonstrating a pattern of racial discrimination. Id.
52. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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defense by making it easier for the plaintiff to show that the defendant's
justifications were merely pretexts for discrimination. 3 The Albemarle Court held that after the defendant has offered evidence of a
business need, the plaintiff can show that alternative, nondiscriminatory
procedures would also fulfill the defendant's business need.54 Such a
showing could be used as evidence that the defendant's actual procedure
was but a pretext for discrimination. 55
The Court refined its Albemarle decision in Furnco Construction
Corp v. Waters.56 In Furnco, the Court pointed out that a showing of
an alternative nondiscriminatory procedure, or even a better nondiscriminatory procedure, would not always prove that a procedure having
disparate effects violates Title VII.57

The Furnco Court stated that

the defendant's course of action need not be the one which produced
the minimum of discriminatory effects. 5 8

It is sufficient that the de-

fendant's procedure be based on some legitimate consideration.59
Against this background the Medical Center court considered
whether intent to discriminate is an essential element of a Title VI
violation, or whether proof of disparate impact is sufficient to establish
a prima facie case.0 0 The court began its analysis by pointing out that
Lau had clearly established that disparate impact is enough to constitute a violation of Title VI.P' The court then considered whether
62
Lau had been overruled by the Supreme Court in Bakke and Harris.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 436.
Id. at 425.
Id.
438 U.S. 567 (1978).

57. Id. at 578. In this Title VII case, Furnco's job superintendent hired
only those persons whom he knew personally to be experienced and competent.
Id. at 569-70. The plaintiff claimed that this practice was discriminatory, because it did not give everyone an equal opportunity to be hired. Id. at 569-74.
The Court found that this was a rational method of getting satisfactory employees, and therefore was not a Title VII violation. Id. at 576-79.
58. Id. at 576-78. The Court stated that the employer's procedure did not
have to be one which resulted in the greatest number of minority applicants
being hired in order to be valid. Id.
59. Id. at 577.
60. 657 F.2d at 1328. The court first noted that the Medicare and Medicaid
payments made to WMC subjected the Center to the provisions of Title VI.
Id. The court also stated that its conclusion would apply to the Rehabilitation
Act and Age Discrimination Act claims as well, since both are patterned after
Title VI. Id. at 1328, 1331. For the text of these acts, see note 6 supra.
61. 657 F.2d at 1329. The court found that the Lau decision, and the
HEW regulations which it quoted, clearly prohibit acts that have the effect,
even though unintentional, of discriminating. Id. For a discussion of Lau and
the HEW regulations, see notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
62. 657 F.2d at 1329-30. For a discussion of Bakke, see notes 28-31 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Harris, see note 33 and accompanying text supra.
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Responding first to the contention that Bakke overruled Lau, the
court observed that while five Justices in Bakke expressed doubts about
Lau,6 3 the issue in Bakke was substantially different from that in Lau
and the case at bar. 64 The Medical Center court stated that the issue
before the Bakke Court was whether some form of intentional prefer65
ence to remedy past discrimination was permissible under Title VI.
The Third Circuit interpreted Bakke to say that only those forms of
intentional preferences permitted by the Constitution are also permissible under Title VI.66 The court reasoned that while the constitutional standard for affirmative action had been applied to Title VI, it
did not necessarily follow that the constitution should determine the
67
question of whether disparate impact constituted a Title VI violation.
In the case before it, the Medical Center court found the issue to be
one of disparate impact from a facially neutral program, and stated that
in this type of case it is permissible to hold that a prima facie case' can
be established without proof of intent.68
In response to the defendants' contention that Harris overruled
Lau, the Medical Center court stated that the Harris Court did not
reach the Title VI issue 69 and in fact, noted that Congress could go
further than the Constitution does in prohibiting intentional discrimination.70 The Third Circuit then pointed out that a plurality of the
Court in Fullilove had cited with approval Lau's validation of federal
regulations prohibiting acts which are discriminatory in effect only. 71
Based on these findings, the Third Circuit concluded that Bakke and
Harris may have questioned the continued validity of Lau and its
72
impact test, but could not be interpreted as overruling Lau.
As additional support for the validity of an impact or effects test
63. 657 F.2d at
about Lau, see notes
64. 657 F.2d at
65. Id. at 1330.

1329. For a discussion of the Bakke Court's reservations
30-32 and accompanying text supra.
i329.
Bakke involved the use of quotas in an affirmative action

program or "reverse discrimination."
66. 657 F.2d at 1330.

See note 29 and accompanying text supra.

67. Id. The Medical Cen'ter court noted that, although the Brennan and
Powell opinions in Bakke stated that "Title VI incorporates the constitutional
standard," this statement should be limited to cases of affirmative action. Id.
For a discussion of Justice Brennan's and Justice Powell's opinions, see notes
30-32 and accompanying text supra.
68. 657 F.2d at 1330.
69. Id. The Harris Court was interpreting § 702(b) of the Emergency
School Aid Act and did not need to rule on Title VI. 444 U.S. at 132. For a
discussion of Harris,see note 33 and accompanying text supra.
70. 657 F.2d at 1330. The Medical Center court observed that only the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart in Harris stated that Title VI was limited
to prohibiting intentional discrimination. 657 F.2d at 1330. For a discussion of
the dissent's reasoning in Harris,see note 33 supra.
71. 657 F.2d at 1330. For a discussion of Fullilove, see notes 39-42. and
accompanying text supra.
72. 657 F.2d at 1330. The court also felt that it was not within its peroga"
tive to overrule Lau. Id.
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in Title VI cases; the court looked to the intent of Congress. 73 It found
that the use of an effects test was consistent with the legislative aim of
eliminating discrimination. 74 Based on its analysis of Lau, Bakke, and
Harris,as well as its interpretation of the legislative history, the Medical
Center court concluded that plaintiffs in a Title VI case alleging discrimination in a facially neutral, federally funded program, need only
establish disparate impact. 75
In defining the proper burden of proof in a disparate impact case,
the Medical Center court looked to the case law under Title VII for
guidance.76 The court stated that after the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie Title VII case, the defendant has the burden of producing evi-

dence justifying his actions.7 7 However, the court stated that the ulti78
mate burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff in a Title VII case.
The Medical Center court rejected the plaintiff's contention that a
defendant in an impact case, who attempts to demonstrate a valid
business purpose for his actions, presents an affirmative defense and
thereby assumes the burden of persuasion.79 The court found this contrary to Supreme Court holdings in Title VII cases.8 0 In reviewing
those cases, the Medical Center court first noted that the establishment
of a prima facie case creates an inference of discrimination, and is not
73. Id. at 1331.
74. Id. For a discussion of the relevant legislative history, see notes 13-16
and accompanying text supra. In addition, the court observed that an effects
test would be in harmony with Title VII, and would parallel federal regulations
adopted to enforce Title VI. 657 F.2d at 1331. Title VII cases which applied
an effects standard include Griggs and Albermarle. For a discussion of these
two cases, see notes 46-48 & 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
75. 657 F.2d at 1331.
76. Id. at 1333. The Medical Center court stated: "The parties agree that
the decisional law allocating the burdens of production and persuasion under
Title VII is instructive in this case." Id. See notes 46-59 and accompanying
text supra for a discussion of this case law.
77. 657 F.2d at 1333. The court assumed, arguendo, as had the district
court, that a prima facie case was established. Id.
78. Id. The court stated that recent cases in the Supreme Court and the
Third Circuit have established that the ultimate burden on the issue of discrimination remains with the plaintiff. Id., citing Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439
U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); McNeil v.
McDonough, No. 80-1640 (3d Cir. April 24, 1981); Smithers v. Boular, 629 F.2d
892 (3d Cir. 1980); Kundo v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 543 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1980); Whack v. Peabody & Wind Eng'r Co., 595 F.2d 190, 193 (3d Cir.
1979). For a discussion of a sampling of these cases, see notes 45 & 56-59 and
accompanying text supra.
79. 657 F.2d at 1333. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant was presenting "something in the nature of an affirmative defense" by showing evidence
which would justify his actions. Id. If the defendant's response were to be
treated as an affirmative defense, the burden of proof would be shifted to the
defendant, since the party affirmatively asserting a fact has the burden of proving it. See generally 29 AM. JuR. Evidence § 127 (1967).
80. 657 F.2d at 1333. For a discussion of the allocation of burdens of proof
in impact cases, see notes 46-48 & 52-55 supra.
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necessarily proof of an ultimate Title VII violation.81 The defendant
need only show a valid business reason to rebut this inference; 82 the
burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff who must prove that the
business reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.8 3 The court
then found that demonstrating a disparate impact was simply another
way for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and thus create an
inference of discrimination. 84 Therefore, the court reasoned, the defendant can be required to produce evidence to rebut the prima facie
case, but not to prove an affirmative defense, as would be required if
85
the plaintiff had proven his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
The court also noted that requiring the defendant to conclusively prove
a valid business purpose would conflict with the Supreme Court's
three-step allocation of the burden of proof by eliminating the need
for the plaintiff to show that the defendant's stated purpose was only a
pretext for discrimination.8 6
As additional support for its position the Medical Center court
observed that requiring a defendant in a disparate impact case to prove
an affirmative defense would be illogical, as it would impose a heavier
burden on a defendant who might not have had any unlawful intent
than on one who was charged with intentional discrimination. 87 The
court also felt that a procedural distinction between impact and
intent cases would cause unnecessary confusion in the trial courts,
and therefore should be avoided.88 The court observed further that
the Supreme Court has not shown an inclination towards requiring a
shifting of the burden of persuasion in disparate effects cases. 89 In
fact, the Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court recently held the
contrary-that the ultimate burden of proving disparate impact remains with the plaintiff. 90 The Third Circuit concluded that the
81.
82.
83.
84.

657 F.2d at 1333.
Id.
Id. at 1334.
Id.

85. Id. The Third Circuit stated that a prima facie case can be rebutted
by a showing of evidence to the contrary; it need not be overcome by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence. Id.
86. Id. For a description of the "three-step allocation" of the burden of
proof, see text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
87. 657 F.2d at 1335. The court stated that if there was a difference, it
would be more logical to impose a heavier burden on the defendant charged
with an unlawful animus. Id.
88. Id. The court felt that uniformity in procedural aspects was highly desirable and found no important interest which would be served by imposing
different burdens on a single defendant charged with both discriminatory intent
and disparate impact. Id. For a discussion of the possibility of a distinction
between intent and impact cases, see note 59 supra.
89. 657 F.2d at 1335.

90. Id. The Medical Center court found that as recently as 1979, in New
York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1980), the Supreme Court had reaffirmed its position that the burden of proving discriminatory impact is on the

plaintiff. Id.
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burden on the defendant was to go forward with evidence to rebut the
prima facie case, but not to prove an affirmative defense. 9'
Judge Adams concurred in the result, finding that the plaintiff
had failed to make out a prima facie case.9 2 He therefore found it
unnecessary to decide whether Title VI prohibited disparate impact 93
and whether the defendants carried a burden of production or of per94
suasion in rebutting an initial showing of disparate impact.
Judge Gibbons dissented from the majority on the issue of the
burden of proof. 95 Judge Gibbons first pointed out that the defendant
can respond to the prima facie case in one of two ways: by rebutting
the plaintiff's evidence, or by attempting to justify its actions.9 6 If the
defendant in a disparate impact case attempts to justify his action,
Judge Gibbons expressed the view that he can do so only by showing
that such action met valid business needs and that other plans with a
less discriminatory impact did not.9 7

Judge Gibbons stated that when

the defendant attempts to justify his actions, the plaintiff would rarely
have access to evidence which could refute that justification.98 Therefore, in cases where the business need defense is asserted, he felt that
it would be consistent with the congressional intent to assign the burden
91. Id. at 1337. The Medical Center court stated that the district court
in this case had required the defendant "to go 'forward with evidence showing
that it has chosen the least stringent alternative.'" Id., quoting NAACP v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 340 (D. Del. 1980). The
district court, therefore, had imposed a more stringent standard than was actually
required. 657 F.2d at 1337. However, as the district court found for the defendant there was no prejudicial error. Id.
92. 657 F.2d at 1339 (Adams, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1338-39 (Adams, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 1340 (Adams, J., concurring).
95. 657 F.2d at 1340 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Gibbons also refused to join that part of the majority's opinion
which assumed, arguendo, that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case
since he found that the plaintiffs had clearly made this initial showing. Id.
96. Id. at 1350 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Intentional discrimination based on an inference from evidence of a disparate
impact, Judge Gibbons pointed out, can be rebutted by evidence of a proper
business purpose. Id. In a case of disparate impact, however, rebuttal takes
the form of offering evidence to show that such impact will not occur. Id. If
the impact does occur, the defendant can justify his actions by showing that
they are necessary in order to accomplish important objectives. Id.
97. Id. at 1350-51 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. Id. at 1352 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
According to judge Gibbons, "the means of proof of justification will not be
within the reach of the protected class and allocation of the burden of per
suasion will be dispositive." Id. The defendant in disparate impact cases,
Judge Gibbons felt, would always have the proof of justification in his hands,
as he was the decision-maker. Id. at 1355 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). He further stated that the plaintiff rarely, if ever, would
have access to this information. Id. Judge Gibbons distinguished impact cases
from intent cases by stating that in the latter, the plaintiff might be in a better
position than the defendant to develop evidence of intentionally discriminatory
acts. Id.
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of persuasion to the defendant, rather than allow the case to be decided merely by a showing of evidence by the defendant. 99 However,
he agreed that the burden of proof should remain on the plaintiff when
the defendant produces rebutting evidence.'0°
The dissent stated in conclusion that the majority looked only to
intentional discrimination cases for support and that disparate impact
cases should be treated differently. 101 In support of this position, Judge
Gibbons cited Harris and Texas Department of Community Aflairs v.

Burdine,0 2 both of which indicated that the burden of proof may be
shifted to the defendant when the defendant attempts to justify disparate
10
impact.
Upon review of the Medical Center opinion, it is submitted that
the court was incorrect in finding that the Supreme Court had established a Title VI impact standard. 04 The Supreme Court has not
found a violation of Title VI based upon disparate impact alone absent
clear interpretive regulations requiring such a finding.' 65 In finding
a violation based on disparate impact in Lau, the Supreme Court
appears to have relied heavily on an HEW regulation which specifically
provides for a disparate effect standard. 0 6 The Fulilove plurality also
99. Id. at 1352 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Congress' purpose, judge Gibbons believed, was to protect disadvantaged classes
from intentional discriminatory acts. Id. He thus concluded that the assign-

ment of proof to the party receiving federal funds would be consistent with that

intent, since the class to be protected would rarely be able to meet the burden
of proof. Id. Judge Gibbons felt that the problem of developing evidence
could thwart congressional intent, stating, "the problems of developing evidence
and assembling it in admissible form cannot be separated from the fulfillment
of statutory policy flowing from Congressional intent." Id. at 1354 (Gibbons,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of Congress'
intent, see notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
Judge Gibbons also observed that a shift of the burden of proof would not
be unfair to the defendant, as the purpose of litigation in impact cases is to correct inadvertent discrimination and not to punish wrongdoers. Id. at 1353
(Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He further stated
that the presumption in a case such as this is that the defendant is willing to
mitigate the disparate impact, but is constrained by his own needs and lack of
alternatives. Id. Judge Gibbons saw the defendant's burden of proof as being
somewhat akin to proving an affirmative defense. Id.
100. 657 F.2d at 1352 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
101. Id. at 1352-53 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. For a discussion of Harris, see note 33 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of Burdine, see note 45 supra.
103. 657 F.2d at 1353 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
104. See id.
105. See notes 106-11 and accompanying text infra.
106. For a discussion of Lau and the HEW regulations, see notes 21-24 and
accompanying text supra. In finding the Title VI violation, the Lau court
pointed out the existence of the HEW regulations and the fact that they were
promulgated based on the authority granted by Title VI. 414 U.S. at 566-69.
The court also pointed out that the school district had contracted to comply
with the HEW regulations and that the federal government has the power to
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found the presence of federal regulation significant, 107 and explicitly
stated in its discussion of Lau that "we upheld the constitutionality of a
federal regulation applicable to public school systems." 108 Thus, the
Fullilove plurality seems to imply that it is upholding Lau's application
of an HEW regulation to a disparate impact claim, rather than an
application of Title VI to a disparate impact claim. 109
The Third Circuit was correct in concluding that, because the
situations present different issues, Bakke's limitation of Title VI need
not be extended to facially neutral, disparate impact cases."10 However, the Third Circuit failed to find any language in Bakke to support
the position that an impact standard still exists in facially neutral
cases."' In fact, at least four members of the Bakke Court clearly
stated that the courts should apply a constitutional standard to both
intentional and disparate impact Title VI cases." 2- Application of a
fix the terms by which money alloted to the States should be disbursed. Id. at
568-69. This can be taken to mean that it is the federal (HEW) regulations
which are imposing a disparate impact standard on the school district. Id.
Nowhere in Lau.did the Court find an impact standard except in its interpretation of the HEW regulations. See generally id. at 566-69.
107. 448 U.S. at 477. For a discussion of Fullilove, see notes 39-42 and
accompanying text supra.
108. 448 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Burger noted that
"congressional authority extends beyond the prohibition of purposeful discrimination." Id. at 477. This would imply that Congress can take positive
steps to correct past discrimination (as in Fullilove) or can impose an effects
test to find current discrimination (as in Lau) even though the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment would require neither. This
does not answer the question of whether Title VI alone prohibits disparate impact, but it does imply that it would if Congress had so intended.
109, See id. at 477-78. In discussing Lau's use of federal regulations to
achieve congressional objectives, the Fullilove plurality did not indicate that the
Lau decision was based on Title VI at all. Id. In its discussion of the "minority
business enterprise" (MBE) provision of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, the Court stated that "[t]he MBE program, like the federal regulations
reviewed in Lau, primarily regulates state action in the use of federal funds
voluntarily sought and accepted by the grantees subject to statutory and
administrative conditions." Id. at 479. For a discussion of the Fullilove Court's
interpretation of Lau, see note 42 supra.
Also supporting this view is the Harris decision which upheld an effects
or impact standard based on HEW regulations. See 444 U.S. at 150. However, the Court implied that this might be a stricter standard than that of
Title VI. Id. For a discussion of Harris, see note 33 and accompanying text
supra.
110. 657 F.2d at 1330. For a discussion of the Medical Center court's
reasoning on this issue, see notes 64-68 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of Bakke, see notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
111. 657 F.2d at 1330. The Third Circuit stated that the Powell and
Brennan opinions in Bakke may be limited to charges of intentional discrimination. Id. However, it added that it is still permissible to hold that in disparate impact suits, a prima facie case can be established without proof of
intent. Id. While the court stated that such a view is permissible, it did not
present any evidence tending to show that this was the Supreme Court's intended interpretation. Id.
112. See 438 U.S. 265, 351-53. The Brennan opinion in Bakke stated
that "even accepting Lau's implication that impact alone is in some contexts
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constitutional standard to Title VI cases would eliminate disparate
impact as a means of establishing a prima facie case, at least in those
cases where the discriminatory effects are not so great as to raise an
11 3
inference of an intent to discriminate.
It is suggested that if the Supreme Court is indeed requiring the
presence of interpretive regulations in order to establish a disparate
impact standard, then the Medical Center court was incorrect in finding
that Lau had conclusively established a disparate impact standard for
all Title VI claims.114 Such an approach would help explain why
Lau has not been overruled, even though seven members of the Supreme Court have at various times expressed doubts about a Title VI
impact standard. 115
Although the Third Circuit looked to the legislative history to
find a broad, expansive, anti-discrimination intent which would support
an impact standard, 116 it is submitted that the debates in Congress
sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VI, contrary to our view

that new Title VI's definition of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive
with the Constitution's, this would not assist the respondent in the least." Id.
at 352 (emphasis added). This statement was not specifically addressed by the
Third Circuit, but it does not seem to be capable of any interpretation other
than that these justices do not approve of an impact standard for Title VI.
Since three other justices expressed the same view in Harris it would seem
likely that the Supreme Court intends to limit Title VI to the constitutional
standard in facially neutral, disparate impact cases. For a discussion of what
that constitutional standard encompasses, see note 26 supra.
113. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-46 (1976). The "constitutional standard" of Washington generally requires intent to discriminate.
Id. at 239. However, the Washington Court also admitted the possibility that
impact alone would be sufficient to create a constitutional violation in extreme
cases. Id. at 246. For a discussion of that limited impact standard, see note
26 supra. Thus a disparate impact standard could exist for Title VI, although
it would be a much more restrictive one than that adopted in Medical Center.
114. See Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978). The
Califano court interpreted Lau as allowing Congress to establish stricter limits
on discrimination than the Constitution requires. Id. at 587-89. However, the
Califano court also seemed to require that standard to be defined explicitly.
It stated that "[b]ecause we are dealing with an act of Congress, as amplified
by HEW regulations . . . it is permissible for Congress to establish a higher
standard, .

.

. than the constitutional minimums require."

Id. at 588.

115. In Bakke, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun expressed the view that impact alone should not create a prima facie case in Title
VI. 438 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For a discussion of this opinion, see notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
Also, in dissent in Harris, Justices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist explicitly
stated that Title VI had been construed to prohibit only intentional discrimination. 444 U.S. at 160 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of
Harris, see note 33 and accompanying text supra.
116. 657 F.2d at 1331. Supporting the Third Circuit's position is Senator
Humphrey's speech during debate of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See note
15 supra. Senator Humphrey, in summarizing the purpose of Title VI, indicated that racial discrimination is "contrary to national policy, and the moral
sense of the Nation," even though it might not be unconstitutional in all
cases. 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
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also support the view that Title VI should be restricted to a constitutional standard." 17 For example, in the debates on the Civil Rights
Act, several congressmen expressed a fear of the far reaching effects of
Title VI. 1 18 They were assured by proponents of the bill that it would
not create any federal powers not already existing under the Constitution.119 Such statements make it difficult to infere that Congress intended to prohibit actions which unintentionally produce discriminatory
effects.'

20

With respect to the issue of burden of proof, the Third Circuit's
decision that impact and intent cases include the same burdens of
proof is amply supported by case law. 1"1 The court correctly observed
that there is no evidence that the Supreme Court has indicated any
differences in the assignment of burdens of proof. 12 2 It is worthy of
noting that the cases cited by Judge Gibbons in dissent only provide
a
very general, ambiguous statements to support his opinion."
117. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 338, quoting
REC. 5012 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). Many legislators feared the
excessive reach that Title VI would have, and did not want it to be applied
to every alleged incidence of discrimination. Id.
118. Senator Talmadge in criticism of the Civil Rights Bill stated:
Title VI would give the President and his appointees the power to
cripple entire States, entire regions of this country. . . . All that is
required is "an express finding" of a failure to comply with an undefined prohibition against discrimination in the administration of any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
110 CONG. REc. 5251 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge).
119. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 328-30. Proponents of the Civil Rights Bill emphasized that the Bill was to be limited to
a standard consistent with the fourteenth and fifth amendments. Id. In introducing Title VI in the House, Representative Cellar, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, stated that "the bill . . . would, in short assure the existing right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Federal funds. It would
110
not destroy any rights of private property or freedom of association."
This statement was inCONG. REC. 1519 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Cellar).
tended to reassure opponents of the Bill that it would not exceed the existing
protection of the Constitution, in the sense that it would not interfere with
the rights of other persons in its attempts to aid minorities. See id.
120. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 328-40. Justice
Brennan's opinion in Bakke, in extensive discussion of the congressional record,
found no evidence of intent to apply an impact standard to Title VI. Id.
121. See 657 F.2d at 1337. For a review of burden of proof in Title VII
and the application of that law to the case at bar, see notes 43-59 & 79-91 and
accompanying text supra.
122. 657 F.2d at 1335. For a suggestion that some difference may in fact
exist, see note 45 supra.
123. See, id. at 1353 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For the support cited by the
dissent, see notes 33 & 45 supra. The Burdine Court merely stated that
allocations of burdens may differ in a disparate impact case. 101 S. Ct. at 1093
n.5 This statement would appear to be too general to be of much support.
The Harris Court stated that the burden is on the party against whom the
statistical case is made. 444 U.S. at 151. However, the Harris Court also
stated that this burden could perhaps be carried by proof of "educational
necessity" analogous to the "business necessity" of Title VII. Id. Therefore,
it appears that the burden on the defendant is no heavier than that defined
CONG.
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The dissent's observation that different evidence is needed for
rebuttal and justification 124 is valid, but it is submitted that Judge
Gibbons' conclusion that the defendant can only justify his acts by
showing that no other plan produces a lesser impact is not correct.-'
This view is in conflict with Furnco, where the Court stated that the
defendant's plan need not have the least discriminatory effects. 126
Furthermore, the majority opinion correctly found that the Supreme
Court has determined that disparate impact cases follow the same
burden of proof procedures as do intent cases, 127 thereby refuting the
28
dissent's claim that the majority had looked only to intent cases.
In addition, the majority's argument that requiring a different
burden of proof for impact cases would place a heavier burden on a
defendant who lacked unlawful animus,

20

and that it would impose a

procedural burden on the trial courts, also weigh against a varying
burden of proof. 3 ° Consequently, it is submitted that the majority
opinion on the issue of burden of proof is supported by both precedent
and logic.

131

In conclusion, the Medical Center decision should assist the lower
courts by establishing a standard for disparate impact cases arising under
Title VI.132 However, the decision is incorrect in its expansion of the
scope of Title VI's prohibition of racial discrimination. 133 Due to the
difficulty in determining whether the Supreme Court actually intended
an impact standard under Title VI, 1

4

as evidenced by a split in the

35

circuit courts on that issue,
it is submitted that only a Supreme Court
ruling on this question will provide a conclusive answer.
Dennis R. Bartholomew
in the Title VII cases. For a discussion of burden of proof in Title VII cases,
see notes 46-59 and accompanying text supra.
124. 657 F.2d at 1350-51 (Gibbons, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For a discussion of Judge Gibbons' reasoning, see notes 96-100 and
accompanying text supra.
125. See 657 F.2d at 1352.
126. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
127. See 657 F.2d at 1333-34. For a discussion of the majority's analysis,
see notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.
128. See id. at 1352 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id. at 1335.
130. Id.
131. See notes 127-30 and accompanying text supra.
132. See NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290,
311-15 (D. Del. 1980). The district court was uncertain as to what the proper
standard should be, and did not, in fact, resolve that issue. Id. at 311-15.
133. While an impact standard will, of course, lessen the difficulty of establishing a prima facie case, Judge Gibbons points out that it will also encourage
decision makers to consider possible discriminatory consequences of a proposal
before its implementation. 657 F.2d at 1355 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
134. For a discussion of Supreme Court Title VI decisions, see notes 17-24,
28-33 9c 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
135. For a discussion of the opinions of the courts of appeals, see notes
34-38 and accompanying text supra.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-42 U.S.C. § 1981-EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION ACTION UNDER SECTION 1981 REQUIRES PROOF OF
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATORY

CONDUCT

Croker v. Boeing Co. (1981) *
Five black employees of the Vertol Division of the Boeing Company
(Company), brought suit individually 1 and as class representatives 2
against their employer3 in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 4 The plaintiffs alleged that the Company had engaged in racially discriminatory practices in all phases of
employment 5 and that these practices violated the Civil Rights Act of
EDITOR'S NOTE: While at press, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in General Bldg. Contractors Assoc., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 50 U.S.LW.
4975 (June 29, 1982). The holding of that case is pertinent to the issue discussed in this Note in that the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires proof
of discriminatory intent.
1. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1188, 1145 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afJ'd in
part and vacated in part, 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs Mamie Croker,
Eric Travis, Chivis Davis, Sr., Robert Debose and Leolin Dockins were production and maintenance employees at Boeing Vertol. 437 F. Supp. at 1145.
2. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (E.D. Pa. 1977). For a
discussion of the original class certification and the district court's modification
of the class, see note 7 infra.
3. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
Vertol Division of the Boeing Company was formed after Boeing acquired
Vertol Aircraft Corporation. Id. at 1146. The Company, primarily a helicopter manufacturer, is frequently engaged as a government contractor by the
United States Department of Defense. Id. As a government contractor, the
Company must comply with federal nondiscrimination requirements. Id. (citation omitted). Although its employment practices have been audited annually
by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, the Company has never been
barred from obtaining government contracts. 437 F. Supp. at 1146.
The plaintiffs also brought suit against Local No. 1069 of International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America. Id. The plaintiffs and the Union reached a tentative settlement
shortly after the commencement of the trial on the liability issues. Id.
4. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The district
court bifurcated the trial. Id. at 1145. For the opinion regarding the liability
issues, see 437 F. Supp. 1138. For the disposition of attorney's fees and costs,
see Croker v. Boeing Co., 444 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Pa. 1977). For the order and
opinion regarding the damages portion of the action, see Croker v. Boeing
Co., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1783 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
5. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1183-88 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
plaintiffs claimed that an inference of discrimination was raised by evidence
that the percentage of black employees at the Company was never greater than
8.4% and the percentage of blacks in the relevant geographical workforce was
16.14%. Id. at 1183. The plaintiffs also presented evidence which contrasted
the racial composition of employees hired (24.4% black) with that of persons
filing applications (31% to 37% black). Id. at 1184. In addition, the plaintiffs
claimed that the Company's lay-off procedure, which was based upon a formal
seniority system or a "last-hired, first-fired" principle, unlawfully perpetuated
the alleged prior discrimination in hiring. Id. at 1186 & 1188.

(816)
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1866, Title 42, section 1981 of the United States Code (section 1981)

6

and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).7
The plaintiffs also attacked the "job family system" of the Company. Id.
at 1186. Under that system, job classifications were grouped into sixty-one
"families" on the basis of common functional skills. Id. at 1142. The plaintiffs alleged that various Company restrictions made it difficult for an employee
to change "families." Id. at 1163-66. For example, the majority of openings
were filled by employees from lower classifications within the same "family"
and few employees outside that family were considered. Id. at 1163. While
blacks were represented in all "families," the plaintiffs submitted evidence
showing that the lower ranking "families" included the majority of the Company's black employees. Id. at 1163. Plaintiffs claimed that this system was a
"continuing violation of Title VII because it unlawfully perpetuate[d] the
effects of prior discrimination." Id. at 1186.
6. Id. at 1145. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
The plaintiffs also claimed that the Company violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which establishes a cause of action against persons conspiring to deprive others of the equal protection of the laws. Croker
v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1177-78 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The court dismissed the § 1985 claims since the plaintiffs had failed to prove a conspiracy
between the Company and the Union to commit the allegedly discriminatory
acts. Id. at 1178. As the plaintiffs had settled with the Union, the evidence
at trial related almost exclusively to the challenged actions of the Company.
Id. The dismissal of the § 1985 claims was not appealed. 662 F.2d at 981-82.
7. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Section
703 of Title VII provides that:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
Originally, the class was certified to include black persons employed by
the Company from June 19, 1962 to the date of trial (June 30, 1975) and all
unsuccessful applicants for employment who applied after June 6, 1967. 437
F. Supp. at 1178. However, the Company moved to dismiss from the class all
persons whose claims were barred by the relevant statutes of limitations. Id.
With regard to the Title VII claims, the court found that all claims that had
accrued prior to 90 days before plaintiff Croker filed the requisite charges with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission were time barred. Id. at
1178-79. Therefore, the court modified the class under Title VII to include
all black persons who had been employed by the Company or had applications
pending for employment with the Company on or after March 23, 1968. Id.
at 1198. As to the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the court noted that the
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The district court found the Company liable on certain of the
individual plaintiffs' section 1981 and Title VII claims. 8 The district
court dismissed all Title VII class claims on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the Company had engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination. 9

The court further found that the racial

disparities established by the plaintiffs did not justify an inference of
Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not specify a statute of limitations. Id. at 1179.
Thus, the court applied Pennsylvania's six year statute governing claims of
interference with contractual relations and found that all claims under § 1981
that had accrued prior to September, 1965 were barred. Id.
8. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
district court found for plaintiffs Mamie Croker, Leolin Dockins and Chivis
Davis on their Title VII claims on the basis of the Company's discriminatory
refusal to promote them. Id. at 1198. Plaintiffs Croker and Eric Travis also
prevailed in their Title VII and section 1981 claims regarding discriminatory
harassment. Id. The plaintiffs' claims of harassment included allegations that
the Company's supervisory personnel treated black employees differently and
used disparaging language when referring to minority employees. Id. at 119395. The court also found in favor of class members Donald Ferrell and Horace
Dixon on their Title VIII claims for, respectively, discriminatory refusal to
promote and for discriminatory denial of a transfer. Id. The court found in
favor of the Company on all claims submitted by seven additional class
members. Id.
The district court subsequently reversed its finding in favor of class members Donald Ferrell and Horace Dixon based on an intervening Third Circuit
decision. Croker v. Boeing Co., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1788 (E.D.
Pa. 1979), citing Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 582 F.2d 827, 834 (3d
Cir. 1978) (holding that class member claimants who are not named plaintiffs
are not entitled to individual relief where classwide claims are unsuccessful).
The district court also reversed its finding for plaintiff Leolin Dockins on the
ground that her claims of discriminatory acts under Title VII were barred by
the applicable statute of limitation. 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1791.
9. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1192 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
district court acknowledged that a prima facie case of discrimination under
Title VII does not require a showing of intentional discrimination, but that
a showing of disparate impact is sufficient. Id. at 1182. The court further
noted that statistical evidence may be sufficient to show the requisite disparate
impact. Id., citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975). Even though the plaintiffs had submitted extensive
statistical evidence regarding hiring and promotions, the district court found
that this evidence failed to justify an inference of discrimination under Title
VII. 437 F. Supp. at 1186. Noting that a large proportion of positions at the
Company required various skills, the court found that the evidence presented
showed that fewer blacks possessed the requisite skills. Id. at 1185. The court
found that the Company's employment practices were related to various production schedules, cost considerations, and the need for skilled workers. Id. at
1146. The court noted that since the Company was in constant competition
with the other helicopter manufacturers to obtain defense contracts, quality
workmanship and compliance with strict delivery schedules were essential. Id.
The court examined the purposes for the Company's employment practices in
connection with the statistical evidence submitted by the plaintiffs and concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove "the existence of discriminatory effects
by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 1182-83. The court further found
that the Company's procedure for laying-off employees reflected a neutral seniority system and thus, was immune from Title VII attack under International
Bhd. of Teamsters. Id. at 1186-88, citing 431 U.S. 324.
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purposeful discrimination and, thus, dismissed the section 1981 class
claims.' 0
On appeal," the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit 12 affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects except for
the award of costs, 13 holding that section 1981 does not extend to facially
neutral conduct which has the consequence of burdening one race more
than another. Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975 (3rd Cir. 1981).
Pursuant to section two of the thirteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution, 14 the Thirty-ninth Congress enacted a civil rights
10. Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
district court held that the plaintiffs were required to prove discriminatory
intent in order to prevail under § 1981. Id., citing Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976). For a discussion of Washington v. Davis, see notes 34-38 and
accompanying text infra. The Croker court stated that "fairly substantial disparities existed [in hiring] in 1965 and 1966" but that they were not sufficient
to prove intentional discrimination. 437 F. Supp. at 1185.
11. 662 F.2d at 975. The Company moved to dismiss portions of the
appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 981. Four separate orders
had been entered by the district court. First, in June of 1977, the district
court found in favor of certain individual plaintiffs on the issue of liability
and dismissed the class claims under Title VII and § 1981. Croker v. Boeing
Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See notes 8-10 and accompanying
text supra. Second, on November 2, 1977, the district court determined the
awards of counsel fees and costs among the parties without setting the amounts
involved. Croker v. Boeing Co., 444 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Third, in
October, 1979, the district court issued an opinion and an order regarding
damages. Croker v. Boeing Co., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1783 (E.D.
Pa. 1979). Fourth, in March, 1980, the district court determined the amount
of attorney's fees. See 662 F.2d at 681. All four orders were appealed by the
plaintiffs on April 8, 1980. Id. The Company contended that the October,
1979 order constituted the final judgment and that thus, the plaintiffs were
required to appeal the 1977 and 1979 orders within thirty days of the October
1979 judgment.

Id., citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291;

FED.

R. App. P. 4(a).

The Third

Circuit denied the Company's motion to dismiss, finding that a judgment in a
civil rights action is not to "be considered final for purposes of appeal until a
district court has determined the extent of liability for any attorney's fees to

be awarded." 662 F.2d at 684.
12. The case was heard on December 2, 1980 by Judges Aldisert, Hunter
and Higginbotham.

The case was reargued on May 12, 1981 before Chief

Judge Seitz and judges Aldisert, Adams, Gibbons, Hunter, Weis, Garth, Higginbotham and Sloviter. Chief judge Seitz delivered the opinion of the court.
Judges Gibbons and Aldisert each filed dissenting opinions.
13. 662 F.2d at 999. The Third Circuit vacated the November, 1977 order
of the district court to the extent that it awarded costs to the Company. Id.
See Croker v. Boeing Co., 444 F. Supp. 890, 895 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (district court's
disposition of the issue of attorney's fees).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. This amendment provides: "Section 1.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." The supporters
of this amendment felt that the Emancipation Proclamation was insufficient to

eradicate the vestiges of slavery and that a constitutional prohibition was required. See Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thir-

teenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REv. 1, 9 (1975).

In reviewing the legislative

history of the amendment, one commentator has stated that "phrases and con-
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law in 1866 to provide equal rights for all citizens. 15 Prior to 1968, the
cepts used repeatedly throughout the debates" indicate that the thirteenth
amendment was passed to guarantee equal protection of the laws, to safeguard
the constitutional privileges and immunities of all citizens and to enforce these
guarantees. TenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 180-81 (1951). See also Note, Federal Power
to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses
of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449 1974). In
discussing the scope of the thirteenth amendment, this commentator stated that
it was "not restricted to invalidating 'state action' establishing or upholding
slavery, but rather .. .had 'a reflex character .. . establishing and decreeing
universal civil and political freedom throughout the United States....'" Id.
at 452, quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
The supporters of the thirteenth amendment disagreed as to whether it
alone would abolish slavery. Buchanan, supra, at 12. Although the amendment was designed to prohibit both the system and results of slavery, section 2
was added "to remove all doubt and argument about Congress' power to wipe
out the remnants, badges and indicia of slavery." TenBroek, supra, at 180,
186. See also Buchanan, supra, at 15. The Supreme Court has stated that
the thirteenth amendment granted Congress the power "rationally to determine
what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate
that determination into effective legislation." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
15. See Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)). Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed
to all persons born in the United States, except untaxed Indians, the right
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence,
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the
contrary notwithstanding.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
Section 1981 sets forth most of the rights enumerated in the 1866 Act,
whereas § 1982 deals specifically with the property rights listed in the 1866 Act.
See id. §§ 1981, 1982.
Section 2 of the 1866 Act constituted the criminal enforcement provision.
See Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). The modern counterpart of § 2 is 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976). See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
98 (1945).
One commentator has noted that the Thirty-ninth Congress "proceeded
on a theory that effective implementation of the thirteenth amendment required
the legislative identification of specific civil rights and provision for protection
of these rights through the executive and judicial branches of the national
government." Buchanan, supra note 14, at 15. Buchanan further noted that
the bill's sponsor, Senator Trumbull, stated that the 1866 Act was necessary
" 'to abolish slavery, not only in name but in fact.' " Id. at 16, quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865).
After reviewing the debates prior to
enactment of the 1866 Act, Buchanan concluded that "equal protection under
the law and equality of economic opportunity emerge as the dominant themes"
of the civil rights bill. Buchanan, supra note 14, at 16. Another commentator
has concluded that the 1866 Act was a direct response to the Black Codes
enacted in the South and to private acts of discrimination directed toward the
newly freed slaves. TenBroek, supra note 14, at 188-89.
For an extensive review of the legislative history of the 1866 Act, see Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-37 (1968). The Court found that
Congress passed the 1866 Act "'to carry out and guaranty the reality of [the
thirteenth amendment]'" and to give "'practical effect and force'" to the
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Civil Rights Act of 1866 was construed as prohibiting only governmental
racial discrimination. However, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,16 the
Supreme Court reversed longstanding precedent 17 and held that the 1866
8
Act prohibited racial discrimination in the private sale of real estate.'
Subsequently, in Johnson v. Railway Express Co.,19 the Court held that
section 1981's prohibition of racial discrimination in the right to make
20
and enforce contracts extended to private employment relationships.

amendment. Id. at 434, quoting CONG.

GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1865)

(remarks of Rep. Thayer). The Court further noted that the Act was passed
with the belief that Congress "was approving a comprehensive statute forbidding all racial discrimination affecting the basic civil rights enumerated in the
Act." 392 U.S. at 435 (emphasis in original). The Court also stated: "We
think that history leaves no doubt that, if we are to give [the law] the scope
that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.'
Id. at 437, quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966). For a
discussion of Jones, see notes 16-18 and accompanying text infra.
The 1866 Act was re-enacted in 1870. See Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114,
§ 18, 16 Stat. 144 (1870). One commentator has stated that there was disagreement within the Thirty-ninth Congress as to the constitutionality of the 1866
Act. TenBroek, supra note 14, at 200. Some members felt that the thirteenth
amendment was designed merely to free the slave from personal bondage and
that the amendment did not authorize legislation beyond this narrow goal.
Id. at 201. The Congress thus supported the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment and re-enacted the 1866 Act pursuant to that amendment's grant
of power, to dispel any doubts as to the constitutionality of the 1866 Act. Id.
at 200. See also Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. at 435. Prior to the Jones decision,
the Supreme Court concluded that "one of the primary purposes of many
members of Congress in supporting the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate the guarantees of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the
organic law of the land." Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). However, any
doubts as to the derivation of the 1866 Act were settled by the Jones Court
which found that the Act was derived from the thirteenth amendment and
that "[a]ll Congress said in 1870 was that the 1866 law 'is hereby re-enacted.'
That is all Congress meant." Jones v. Mayer, 437 U.S. at 436-37, quoting Act
of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144 (1870).
16. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1 (1906); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Jones Court stated:
"Insofar as Hodges is inconsistent with our holding today, it is hereby overruled." 392 U.S. at 441 n.78.
18. 392 U.S. at 423-26. The Jones decision involved 42 U.S.C. § 1982, the
companion statute to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, both of which are derived from the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. See id. at 412; note 15 supra. As codified, § 1982
provides in pertinent part that "[aill Citizens of the United States shall have
the same right . . .as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1976).
The Jones plaintiffs alleged that the defendant refused to sell them a home
because of the plaintiffs' race. 392 U.S. at 412. The Jones Court determined
that the legislative history of the 1866 Act clearly revealed a congressional
intent to provide a cause of action against private individuals for claims of
racial discrimination. Id. at 423-26.
19. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). The Johnson plaintiffs claimed that their employer violated Title VII and § 1981 by discriminating against black employees
in the application of senority rules and in job assignments. Id. at 455.
20. Id. at 454. The Johnson Court noted that the issue was well-settled
among the courts of appeals. Id. at 459-60 (citations omitted). The Third
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. Prior to the Court's expansive interpretation of the 1866 Act, 21
Congress specifically addressed the issue of employment discrimination
and enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 22 to eliminate
"discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, [sex] or
national origin." 23 Title VII prohibits certain employment practices 24
and evidences Congress' intent to afford all persons equal employment
opportunity.25 The legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress intended that "the remedies available to the individual under Title
VII [were to be] co-extensive with the individual's right to sue under
the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866" and that the two statutes
"augment each other and are not mutually exclusive." 20 Although both
statutes afford overlapping federal remedies for claims of racial discrimination in employment, there are differences in the substantive and pro27
cedural law under each statute.
Circuit had interpreted § 1981 as encompassing private employment discrimination. See Young v. I.T. c T., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971). The Young court
stated that "[fln the context of the Reconstruction it would be hard to imagine
to what contract right the Congress was more likely to have been referring.
Certainly the recently emancipated slaves had little or nothing other than
their personal services about which to contract." Id. at 760.
21. See Note, Section 1981: Discriminatory Purpose or Disproportionate
Impact?, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 137 (1980). This commentator notes that "the

Act lay dormant and practically unused for over a century as a result of the
state action limitation grafted onto it by the Supreme Court." Id. at 187 n.2.
However, the Act was "revitalized" by the Court in 1968. Id., citing Jones v.
Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
accompanying text supra.

For a discussion of Jones, see notes 16-18 and

22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970). For the relevant text of
Title VII, see note 7 supra.
23. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2355, 2401 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 914].
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970). For the text of the prohibited practices,
see note 7 supra.
25. H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 23. The Supreme Court has noted
that Title VII was enacted "to assure equality of employment opportunities by
eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,

415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). See generally Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History,
7 B.C. INDUS. ScCoM. L. REV. 431 (1966).
26. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971). In 1964, the Senate
defeated a proposed amendment to Title VII whidi would have made that
statute the exclusive federal remedy for discrimination in employment. See
110 CONG. REc. 13650-52 (1964). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974). The Gardner-Denver Court noted that the legislative
history of Title VII clearly indicated congressional intent to permit individuals
to pursue their rights under both Title VII and other applicable statutes. Id.
27. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Co., 421 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1975)
(§ 1981 action is not dependent upon Title VII administrative proceedings and
compensatory and punitive damages are available under § 1981); Setser v.
Novack Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1147 (8th Cir. 1981) (§ 1981 creates substantive
rights of its own); Burns v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 564 F.2d 20, 21 (8th Cir.
1977) (§ 1981 statute of limitations did not toll during pendency of Title VII
claim). See generally Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871 to
Redress Employment Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 258, 260 (1976).
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While the Supreme Court has not addressed the standards of proof
for employment discrimination claims under section 1981,28 the Court
has determined that a Title VII claim can be supported by a showing of
30
disparate impact. 29 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Court was con28. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583 n.24
(1979) (finding it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether proof of intent
is required in an employment discrimination claim under § 1981). Argument
was heard on this issue, however, on March 3, 1982 before the Supreme Court
in the matter of Commonwealth of Pa. v. Local Union 542, 469 F. Supp.
329 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd per curiam, 648 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
granted sub noma. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 102 S.Ct.
473 (1981).
See also City of Memphis v. Greene, 101 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 & 1601 (1981).
In a concurrng opinion in City of Memphis Justice White stated that
"[p]urposeful racial discrimination is quite clearly the focus of the proscription [of section 1982], and this understanding of § 1982 is supported by the
Id. at 1602 (White,
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ....

J., concurring).
29. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); notes 30-32 and
accompanying text infra.
Depending on the basis of the claim, employment discrimination claims
may be proved by two methods: disparate impact or disparate treatment.
Under a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie
claim of discrimination by showing a "statistical disparity between the proportion of blacks in the employer's work force and the proportion of blacks
in the relevant labor market." Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d
830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden
shifts to the employer to show the business necessity of the challenged practice. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The plaintiff
must then have an opportunity to show that other practices that do not result
in a discriminatory impact would serve the legitimate interest of the employer.
Id. at 425. See also L. MODJESKA, HANDLING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CASES,

§ 1.7 (1980).

The fact situation involved in a Title VII claim may be such that proof
of disparate treatment is required. See L. MODJESKA, supra, § 1.8. Disparate
treatment claims involve allegations that an employer has treated an individual or group "less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). The Supreme Court has adopted a
framework for establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment in which
the plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell-Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (footnote
omitted). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the
employer to show some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the rejection.
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981). The
ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination remains at all times
with the plaintiff. Id. at 1093. A prima facie showing is not the equivalent
of a showing of intent to discriminate; intent is inferred from the prima facie
showing because "experience has proved that in the absence of any other
explanation it is more likely than not" that the challenged actions were
the result of a discriminatory purpose. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978).
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fronted with an employment practice that was facially neutral, but had
resulted in a disproportionate impact on black applicants for employment.3 1 The Griggs Court held that a claimant need not prove that
his employer was motivated by a discriminatory purpose to establish a
2
Title VII claim and fashioned the disparate impact theory.a
The Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of the correct
standard of proof to be applied in employment discrimination claims
brought under the United States Constitution.33 In the 1976 case of
Washington v. Davis,8 4 the Court held that the Court of Appeals for the
The courts of appeals have held that disparate treatment claims under
§ 1981 involve the same burdens and allocations of proof as claims under
Title VII. See Baldwin v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 648 F.2d 950 (5th
Cir. 1981); Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 620 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1980).
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
31. Id. The plaintiffs in Griggs challenged the defendant power company's practice of requiring a high school education or a passing grade on an
intelligence test as a prerequisite for employment. Id. at 425-26. The
plaintiffs claimed that these requirements were unrelated to job content and
resulted in a disproportionate number of black applicants failing to meet
the employment standards. Id. at 426. The court of appeals found that a
Title VII claim based upon disproportionate impact did not establish a prima
facie case and that the plaintiffs must prove that the defendant has a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 163.
32. 401 U.S. at 432. The Griggs court noted that the plain intent of
Congress in enacting Title VII was to "achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees." Id. at 429-30.
The Court further stated that "good intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability." Id. at 432. See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (proof of discriminatory motive is
not required under a disparate impact theory).
The Griggs impact analysis was specifically approved by Congress during
presentation of the 1972 amendments to Title VII. See H.R. REP. No. 238,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. 8, reprin'ted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. Re AD. NEWS 2137,
2144. The House report notes that employment discrimination "is a far
more complex and prevasive phenomenon" than was viewed by Congress in
1964. Id. Finding that the experts on employment discrimination describe
the field "in terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather than simply intentional
wrongs," the report cited Griggs with approval. Id.
33. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); notes 34-38 infra.
34. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The plaintiffs challenged a qualifying test given
to applicants for positions as police officers in the District of Columbia. That
allegedly excluded a disproportionately higher number of black applicants
and thus, was a violation of their right to equal protection. Id. at 233.
The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the district
court requesting a declaration that the challenged test violated the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 234. The Washington plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the constitutional issue was denied
by the District Court. Id. Relying on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court and granted the plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment, holding that disproportionate impact
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District of Columbia had incorrectly applied the disparate impact stand85
The
ard to claims brought under the United States Constitution.
is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation of employment rights.
Id. at 236-37. For a discussion of Griggs, see notes 30-32 and accompanying
text supra.
35. 426 U.S. at 239. The Court found that the constitutional standard
for adjudicating claims of racial discrimination was not identical to that of
Title VII. Id. The Court noted that the "central purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official
conduct discriminating on the basis of race." Id. After examining prior
decisions, the Court concluded that proof of disparate impact, standing
alone, has never been sufficient to invalidate a law on constitutional grounds.
Id., citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (rejecting attack on
various provisions of Social Security Act based on proof of disparate impact
without proof of racial motivation); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972) (rejecting attack on jury selection system that resulted in disproportionate black representation); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (attack on apportionment statute requires proof of discriminatory motivation);
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) (purpose to discriminate must be present
in jury discrimination claim). The Court noted that a disparate impact may
be revelant in cases involving discrimination claims brought under the constitution. 426 U.S. at 241. The Court stated that "[n]ecessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily
on one race than another." Id. at 242. The Court further noted that although
disproportionate impact may be relevant, it is not the "sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution." Id.
Subsequent decisions have elucidated the type of discriminatory purpose
required by Washington. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979); City of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977). The Feeney Court stated:
Discriminatory purpose, however, implies more than intent as volition
or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite
of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.
442 U.S. at 279 (citation omitted).
Although Washington v. Davis clearly establishes that proof of intent is
required under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, several courts have implicitly recognized that Congress has the power under the fourteenth amendment to enact legislation which permits proof of discrimination solely through
evidence of disparate impact. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d
897 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. City of
Chicago, 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v.
City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. United States
v. Banta, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Commonwealth v. Rizzo, 466 F. Supp. 1219
(E.D. Pa. 1979). In Scott, the Fifth Circuit held that the 1972 amendments
to Title VII, enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the fourteenth amendment, were meant to continue the disparate impact standard of proof in actions
against governmental entities. 597 F.2d at 900. The Scott court reasoned
that Congress is authorized to enact more stringent standards than those
provided by the fourteenth amendment. Id.
In Rizzo, the district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found
that Congress was aware of the impact standard articulated in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. when the 1972 amendments were enacted. 466 F. Supp. at 1226,
citing Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (1972). The Rizzo court held that Congress has the power under
the fourteenth amendment to enact legislation permitting a disparate impact
standard of proof. 466 F. Supp. at 1227.
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Court found that the challenged practices established a "racially neutral
qualification for employment," 36 and thus, could not deny any person
equal protection of the laws solely because it impacted disproportionately upon one protected group. 7 The Court concluded that the "constitutional rule required a showing of discriminatory intent." 38
The Washington decision has had a profound impact on the determination of standards of proof under section 1981.3 9 Although several
federal courts have applied the Title VII disparate impact standard to
section 1981 claims, 40

36. 426 U.S. at 245.

the majority of circuit courts have construed

The Court noted that the test challenged by the

Washington plaintiffs was administered generally to prospective government
employees. Id.
37. Id. at 246. The Court stated:
Respondents, as Negroes, could no more successfully claim that the
test denied them equal protection than could white applicants who
failed. The conclusion would not be different in the face of proof
that more Negroes than whites had been disqualified by Test 21.
That other Negroes also failed to score well would alone, not demonstrate that respondents individually were being denied equal protection
of the laws by the application of an otherwise valid qualifying test
being administered to prospective police recruits.
Id.
38. Id. While the Court recognized the disproportionate impact of the
challenged procedure on blacks, it found that the defendant's affirmative efforts
to recruit black officers and the relationship of the challenged test to job
requirements negated the charge of discrimination. Id.
In addition, the Court expressed its concern that the application of disparate impact analysis to equal protection claims could result in the invalidation of numerous statutes. Id. at 248. The Court stated:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole
range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes
that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black
than to the more affluent white.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See also Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977). But see Schwemm, From Washington to
Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection
Litigation, U. ILL. L.F. 961, 990-94 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1980).
See also Heiser, Intent v. Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 16
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207 (1979); Note, supra note 21.
40. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated
as moot, County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); Kinsey v. First
Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kirkland v. New York State
Dept. of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 823 (1976); Chicano Police Officers Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir.
1975); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Erie Human
Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); Gutierrez v. Aero
Mayflower Transit Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA), 447 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
In Davis v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit declined to impose
an intent requirement in section 1981 claims, stating that such a finding would:
dilute what has been a potent remedy for ills of countless minority
employees subjected to the unlawful discriminatory conduct of their
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Washington as requiring proof of a discriminatory purpose to establish
an employment discrimination claim under section 1981.41 For example,
the Second Circuit, in Guardians Association of New York v. Civil
Service Commission,42 rejected a section 1981 challenge by black police
department employees to the lay-off policies of the department. 43 The
Guardian plaintiffs alleged that the challenged practices resulted in a
racially disproportionate impact and, thus, violated Title VII and section
1981. 44 The Second Circuit found that the section 1981 claim required
a showing of discriminatory purpose rather than simply disparate impact.45 The Guardian court based its decision upon the language of the
statute, 46 the legislative history of the 1866 act,4 7 and the scope of the
employers. Thus, we cannot conclude that [Washington v. Davis] embraced a ruling that a showing of disproportionate impact no longer
will suffice to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under § 1981.
566 F.2d at 1340.
41. See Grano v. City of Columbus, 637 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1980); Craig
v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 1980); Lee v. Washington
County Bd. of Educ., 625 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied; Donnell v. General
Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1978); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker
Corp., 552 *F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Sabol v. Snyder, 425 F.2d 1009 (10th
Cir. 1975).
See also Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Whiting court stated:
There is no question that under section 1981, the plaintiff must establish purposeful discrimination equivalent to that required by those
alleging fourteenth amendment dereliction. .-. . But when section
1981 is merely used as a companion remedy provision to [Title VII],
we hold that such intent should be inferred in the same manner as
Waters.
Id. at 121, citing Furnco v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (discussing disparate
treatment prima facie case under Title VII). For a discussion of Waters, see
note 29 supra.
42. 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980).
43. Id. at 235. The plaintiffs claimed that preemployment examinations
given from 1968 to 1970 were discriminatory. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs alleged
that they were hired at a later date than they would have been had the examinations been fair and that, under the police department's "last-in-first-out"
lay-off policy, the plaintiffs were disproportionately dismissed. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 267. The Guardian court recognized that § 1981 and Title VII
overlap to a certain extent and that they complement each other in the field
of employment discrimination. Id. However, the court concluded that 1981
and Title VII "were not intended to reach precisely the same conduct." Id.
The court further noted that it lacked the power "to reshape § 1981 in the
mold of Title VII" and that only Congress could do that. Id.
46. Id. at 266. The Second Circuit found that nothing in the language
of § 1981 supports the theory that the statute was intended to prohibit the
disparate impact of facially neutral practices. Id. Noting that as long as the
challenged lists were used, no applicant, regardless of race, could secure employment with defendants without achieving a passing grade, the court found
that "[a]ll applicants were in fact permitted to compete for employment on
precisely the same terms." Id.
47. Id. at 267. After noting that the proper inquiry was the intent of
Congress in passing § 1981, the court found nothing in the history of the enact-
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statute.
The Croker court began its analysis by stating that it had not
previously squarely addressed the issue of the standard of proof required
in employment discrimination claims under section 1981. 4 9 Chief Judge
Seitz noted that since the United States Supreme Court decision in
Washington v. Davis,50 the majority of circuits have required a plaintiff
to prove purposeful discrimination in section 1981 claims. 51 While
recognizing that the Washington Court had addressed the standard of
proof in a claim under the fifth amendment and not under section
1981,62 the court reasoned that the Washington decision required a
reexamination of the issue, 5 3 in light of the numerous courts of appeals'
54
decisions reassessing section 1981.
ment or re-enactment of § 1981 to indicate that Congress intended to reach
conduct other than the "racially motivated refusal to treat whites and nonwhites in the same, neutral manner." Id. at 266-67. For a discussion of the
legislative history of § 1981, see notes 14 & 15 supra.
48. 633 F.2d at 267. The court stated:
We consider it almost inconceivable that § 1981 was intended to outlaw in one stroke, facially neutral practices bearing on the ability of
persons to make contracts concerning sales, rentals, banking, public
accommodations, private schooling, insurance, personal services, or
anything else, where such practices have a disproportionate racial
impact unjustified by some type of necessity.
Id.
This reasoning has been adopted by several federal district courts and
courts of appeals. See note 41 supra. But see Kinsey v. First Regional Sec.,
Inc., 557 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Kinsey court found that the plaintiffs, who were proceeding under Title VII and section 1981, were not required
to show a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 838 n.22. Of the circuits that have
addressed this issue since the Supreme Court's decision in Washington, the
District of Columbia Circuit appears to be the only one that has maintained
the view that a showing of disparate impact is sufficient to support a section
1981 claim.
49. 662 F.2d at 984. The majority acknowledged that prior Third Circuit
decisions could reasonably be interpreted as not requiring proof of intent in
such actions. Id., citing Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d
371 (3d Cir. 1974) (a prima facie claim under § 1981 is established by evidence
that blacks are under-represented and that an opportunity for racial discrimination existed).
50. For a discussion of Washington v. Davis, see notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra.
51. 662 F.2d at 984. For the courts of appeals that require proof of intent
under § 1981, see note 41 supra. The court highlighted the Second Circuit's
statement that: "'Before Washington v. Davis, we had approached § 1981 with
the belief that the Constitution itself prohibited conduct having a discriminatory effect. Now that our constitutional premise has been declared erroneous,
we must of course reconsider our statutory conclusion.'"
662 F.2d at 985,
quoting Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d at 264. For a discussion of Guardians,see notes 42-48 and accompanying text supra.
52. The analysis of the Washington Court is also applicable to cases
brought under the fourteenth amendment.
53. 662 F.2d at 984.
54. 662 F.2d at 985.
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In considering the language of the statute, 55 the Third Circuit noted
that section 1981's guarantee of the " 'same right' to make contracts 'as
is enjoyed by white citizens' is similar to the guarantee of 'equal protection' embodied in the fourteenth amendment." 56 The Croker majority also stressed that the language of section 1981 is "less susceptible of
an interpretation permitting an impact standard" than that of Title
VII.5 7

The court found, based on the express language of the statute,

that it could not conclude that the thrust of section 1981 was directed
to the consequences of employment practices. "s Noting that the language
of the statute was inconclusive, the court turned to the legislative history

59
of section 1981 in order to ascertain congressional intent.

In reviewing the enactment history of section 1981 60 and the statute's ties to both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendment, 61 the Croker
55. Id. at 986. For the text of § 1981, see note 6 supra. The court
stated that the language of § 1981 was inconclusive. 662 F.2d at 986.
56. 662 F.2d at 986. The Croker majority stated that "as long as both

white and nonwhite employees are subject to the same employment requirements or restrictions, both may be said to have been granted the right to

contract on equal terms." Id. Chief Judge Seitz noted that the Supreme
Court could not view for employment as racially discriminatory as a denial
of equal protection " 'simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to

qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups.' "

Id., quoting

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245. The Croker court found that it was
faced with the same difficulty in construing § 1981's similar guarantee of the
right to make contracts. 662 F.2d at 986.

57. 662 F.2d at 986.

The court examined the language of Title VII,

which prohibits practices that "limit, segregate, or classify" employees or
applicants in a way which would deprive or tend to deprive them of opportunities because of their race or color. Id. For the relevant text of Title
VIi, see note 7 supra. The Croker majority found that language consistent
with an impact standard of proof, but determined that the language of
§ 1981 required no such conclusion. 662 F.2d at 986. For the text of § 1981,
see note 6 supra.
58. 662 F.2d 986. The Croker court recognized that where facially neutral employment practices have a disparate impact on nonwhite citizens, those
citizens cannot be said to enjoy the same rights as white citizens. Id. Although the court found this a tenuous reading of the language of § 1981, it
noted that such a reading was indicative of the statute's inconclusiveness. Id.
59. Id. at 986-87.
60. Id. at 987. The Third Circuit noted that § 1981 was first enacted by
Congress pursuant to the authority granted by section 2 of the thirteenth
amendment. Id. at 987. The Croker majority acknowledged the plaintiffs'
argument that under the thirteenth amendment "motivation is irrelevant when
one is concentrating on the destruction of the institution of slavery and its
lingering manifestations in private employment practices." Id., citing Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). However, the court found § 1981 has
"some ties to the fourteenth amendment," since it was reenacted in 1870,
after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. 662 F.2d at 987 (citations
omitted). For a discussion of the history of the enactments of section 1981,
see note 15 supra.
61. 662 F.2d at 988. For the text of the thirteenth amendment and its
connection with § 1981, see notes 14-15 supra. The Croker court acknowledged that "the scope of the thirteenth amendment and § 1981 is not coextensive with the scope of the fourteenth amendment." 662 F.2d at 988,
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court found that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was promulgated to "give
real content to the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment." 62 However, the court noted that the legislative history did not
reveal whether that content includes protection from "facially neutral
actions having a discriminatory impact." 3 Rather, the Third Circuit
found it more likely that the 1866 Act was directed towards intentional
conduct. 6 4 While admitting that both the language and legislative history of section 1981 failed to provide a definitive answer to the standard
of proof issue, the Croker majority found that a standard requiring
intent was "more consistent with the language of and impetus behind"
the statute. 65
Turning to policy considerations, the Third Circuit noted that
section 1981 covers private as well as governmental conduct. 66 As such,
the Croker court found that the application of an impact standard to
section 1981 claims would be even more intrusive than its application
to fourteenth amendment claims. 6 T Finally, the Croker majority rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that liability under section 1981 and Title VII
is coextensive.6 8 While noting that proof of disparate impact may be
citing City of Memphis v. Greene, 101 S. Ct. 1584, 1604 (1981) (White, J.,
concurring). For a discussion of Justice White's concurring opinion in City
of Memphis, see note 28 supra. The Croker court noted that the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the thirteenth amendment grants to Congress
the "power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges
and incidents of slavery." Id. at 987, citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20

(1883).

62. 662 F.2d at 987, citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at
433, 435. For a discussion of Jones, see notes 16-18 and accompanying text
supra.
63. 662 F.2d at 987-88.
64. Id. at 988. The court found that the 1866 act was a response to
the power of the Ku Klux Klan and to the adoption of the black codes. Id.
While the court acknowledged that the black codes did contain some facially
neutral provisions, it found that they were designed to be and were purposefully applied in a discriminatory manner. Id.
65. Id. The Third Circuit reemphasized the fact that the majority of
circuits faced with this issue since Washington v. Davis have required proof
of discriminatory intent. Id.
66. Id. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 413; notes 14-18
and accompanying text supra.
67. 662 F.2d at 988. The Croker court emphasized the Supreme Court's
concern that a disparate impact standard of proof for fourteenth amendment
claims might "invalidate a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and
to the average black than to the more affluent white.' " Id., quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. The court noted that a disparate impact
standard under § 1981 would, to a significant extent, have the same consequences. 662 F.2d at 988. For a discussion of the policy considerations
addressed in Washington v. Davis, see note 38 supra.
The court voiced its reluctance to ignore the concerns expressed in
Washington without a clear indication that Congress intended § 1981 to include "nonpurposeful conduct or neutral regulations having a disproportionate impact." 662 F.2d at 989.
68. 662 F.2d at 989. The Croker court distinguished Title VII on the
basis of its detailed administrative procedures, limitation of coverage to the
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69
significant in proving discriminatory intent, the Croker court affirmed
the finding of the district court that the plaintiffs' evidence was insuffi70
cient to prove purposeful discrimination against the class.
71
Judge Aldisert, dissenting in part and concurring in part, initially
noted that the court faced a statutory void in that the question raised
72
Thus, Judge Aldisert approached the
had never occurred to Congress.
73
issue in the context of employment discrimination law as a whole.
While recognizing the differences between Title VII and section 1981,
judge Aldisert found that they did not require proof of different ele74
After a discussion of judicial
ments to sustain a claim for relief.
75
interpretations of employment discrimination statutes, Judge Aldisert

area of employment discrimination and its language. Id. For a discussion
of the substantive and procedural differences between the two statutes, see
note 27 and accompanying text supra.
69. 662 F.2d at 989, citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 242 (1976).
70. 662 F.2d at 989. The Third Circuit affirmed the finding of the district court that intentional discrimination had been proven in certain individual plaintiffs' claims under § 1981. Id. For a discussion of the individual
§ 1981 claims, see note 8 supra.
71. 662 F.2d at 999 (Aldisert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Higginbotham joined in the opinion. Id. Judge Aldisert
joined in all parts of the majority opinion with the exception of the majority's
holding on the § 1981 issue. Id.
72. Id. Judge Aldisert noted that the § 1981 issue was solely one of
statutory construction and agreed with the majority's finding that neither the
language nor the legislative history of § 1981 provided guidance for its constuction. Id. Thus, he found that the court was confronted with "a problem
of lacuna, a non-existent norm." Id. (footnote omitted).
73. Id. In view of the statutory void which existed with respect to § 1981,
judge Aldisert concluded that he would follow the "sound law approach:
'sound in terms of the new use and demands of society as related to the
Warticular area of law to which the statute refers.'" Id. at 999-1000, quoting
. Leflar, Statutory Construction: The Sound Law Approach, in R. ALDISERT,
The Judicial Process 177, 180 (1977). Judge Aldisert found that this approach
required a consideration of § 1981 in conjunction with Title VII. 662 F.2d
at 1000 (Aldisert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. 662 F.2d at 1000 (Aldisert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). judge Aldisert noted that the legislative history of Title VII indicates
a congressional intent for Title VII remedies to be co-extensive with those
under section 1981. Id., citing H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2154. Judge Aldisert
found that Congress "deliberately designed the twin remedies [§ 1981 and
Title VII] to cover the entire field of employment discrimination based on
race." 662 F.2d at 1000 (Aldisert J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Aldisert then stated that "public policy as manifested by congressional activity is to expand, and not to contract, the reach of statutes
Id. Noting that Congress endealing with employment discrimination."
acted "massive amendments to Title VII in 1972," Judge Aldisert thought it
relevant that Congress did not attempt to change the judicially created impact
standard. Id.
75. 662 F.2d at 1001 (Aldisert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Aldisert found that the "colossus of our employment discrimination law" had not been established through judicial gloss on the language
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concluded that the "traditional wisdom" that had evolved from judicial
construction of Title VII should be applied to section 1981 cases. 70
Finally, Judge Aldisert observed that racial discrimination can be "the
most virulent of strains that infect a society" and that the "profound
national policy of opposition to racial discrimination must continuously
and unstintingly concentrate on its eradication in employment." 77
Judge Gibbons, dissenting in part and concurring in part,7 8 found
that the impetus behind 79 and legislative history 80 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 indicate that section 1981 was meant to redress facially
of § 1981, but rather on the text of Title VII. Id. Noting that the courts,
rather than Congress, had formulated the dichotomy under which claims can
be established through proof of disparate impact as well as disparate treatment, Judge Aldisert found that the courts should not now unduly complicate employment discrimination actions. Id. Judge Aldisert stated that consistency of judicial interpretation in all areas of employment discrimination
law would result in increased understanding and acceptability of this body of
law by the lay public. Id. at 1002 (Aldisert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. Id. Judge Aldisert stated that he did not believe that Congress intended for § 1981 to be interpreted in one way with regard to the standard
of proof and Title VII in another. Id.
77. Id. at 1002 (Aldisert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Aldisert would have reversed the district court's judgment insofar as
it held that the plaintiffs were required to prove intentional discrimination
to prevail in their § 1981 claims. Id.
78. Id. at 1002 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judges Higginbotham and Sloviter joined in the opinion. Id. Judge Gibbons concurred with the majority in all parts of the majority opinion except
for the holding that a plaintiff relying on § 1981 must establish a racially
discriminatory purpose. Id.
79. Id. Judge Gibbons examined the history of the first session of the
Thirty-ninth Congress, noting that the session was largely devoted to reconstructing the post-war society in the South. Id. at 1003-04 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Gibbons reasoned that the
impetus behind this reconstruction must be considered in analyzing the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Id. After an extensive review of the program of postslavery redevelopment Judge Gibbons found it a bit "far fetched" for the
majority to suggest that the state was not "intended to reach facially neutral
conduct having a disproportionate impact upon the job opportunities of
Blacks." Id.
80. Id. at 1003-06. (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Gibbons relied, in part, upon a working paper prepared for a committee of the Thirty-ninth Congress indicating the extent of employment
discrimination against Blacks in the South. ld. at 1004 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing SENATE EXECUTIVE DOCUMENT
No. 2 (Dec. 19, 1865), 39th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in VIRGINIA COMMISSION
ON CONSTITUTIONAL
BATES 87, 88 (1967).

GOVERNMENT,

THE

RECONSTRUCTION

AMENDMENTS'

DE-

The report included extensive documentation of discrimination in the South against blacks in employment opportunities. 662 F.2d
at 1004 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Gibbons found that t e report also described laws which were facially neutral.
Id. Finding that this report was central to the deliberations of the Thirtyninth Congress, Judge Gibbons noted that the Congress in 1866 had the
desire to invalidate facially neutral job requirements having a discriminatory
impact. Id.
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neutral practices having a disparate impact upon black citizens. 81 Further, Judge Gibbons noted that the majority decision conflicted with the
prior policy of the Third Circuit in harmonizing Title VII and section
1981.82

It is submitted that the Croker majority has disregarded the longstanding rule that laws proscribing discrimination should be broadly
construed. 8
The court recognized that the language and legislative
history of section 1981 are ambiguous,8 4 and under such circumstances, a
liberal interpretation of the statute was warranted.
In analyzing the language of the statute, the Third Circuit focused
on the similarity between the guarantee of the right to contract contained in section 1981 85 and the constitutional guarantee of equal rights
examined by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis.8 6 However,
the guarantee of equal opportunity intended by Congress in 1866 87 is
also similar to the equality of opportunity underlying the enactment of
81. 662 F.2d at 1004 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Gibbons reasoned that the Thirty-ninth Congress was concerned
ith the result of slavery and that, therefore, the intent of Congress would
have been to require disparate impact as a standard of proof under § 1981.
Id. at 1006 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 1006 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
citing Young v. I.T.&T., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that section
1981 was not affected by the enactment of Title VII).
Judge Gibbons also found that the Thirty-ninth Congress failed to provide for issues such as the standard of proof under the 1866 Act because it
"expected that in filling in the interstices in civil litigation, the courts would
do so mindful of the social purpose of the legislation." 662 F.2d at 1007
(Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Reviewing the
history of judicial enforcement of the 1866 Act, Judge Gibbons found that
the Croker majority chose an interpretation of § 1981 that would inhibit its
purpose as had judicial interpretations prior to the 1960's. Id. Finally.
Judge Gibbons distinguished Washington v. Davis, relied upon by the majority, on the basis that Washington failed to address the question of whether
Congress has the authority under the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments
to enact a statute providing for liability based upon proof of impact. Id.
For a discussion of Washington v. Davis, see notes 34-38 and accompanying
text supra.
83. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 439. For a discussion of Jones, see notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra, notes 14-15
supra.
84. 662 F.2d at 986-88. For the text of § 1981, see note 6 supra. For a
discussion of the legislative history of § 1981, see notes 14-15 supra.
85. 662 F.2d at 886.

For the text of § 1981, see note 6 supra.

86. 662 F.2d at 886. For a discussion of Washington, see notes 34-38 and
accompanying text supra.
87. See Buchanan, supra note
legislative history of the 1866 Act
portunity was one of the dominant
For a discussion of the legislative
supra.

14, at 15-21. Buchanan's review of the
indicates that equality of economic opthemes of the civil rights bill. Id. at 16.
history of the 1866 Act, see notes 14-15
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Title VII. s s In addition, the fact that section 1981 was re-enacted in
1870 pursuant to the authority granted Congress under the fourteenth
amendment does not support the adoption of the Washington rationale, s9
as the dominant constitutional foundation for the 1866 Act was not the
fourteenth, but the thirteenth amendment.9 0 Moreover, as the Croker
court noted, the plaintiffs' claim in Washington of a constitutional infringement must be distinguished from the Croker plaintiffs allegations
of a statutory violation. 91 However, the Third Circuit failed to give
sufficient weight to this distinction. There is ample authority for the
proposition that Congress had the power under the fourteenth amendment to enact amendments to Title VII which imposed liability upon
proof of disparate impact. 92 In avoiding the determination of whether
Congress has the power to enact legislation under the thirteenth amendment imposing the disparate impact standard of proof in section 1981
claims, the Croker court failed to address a cogent basis for finding that
the Washington holding does not apply to a statutory claim.93
Regardless of the appropriateness of applying the Washington
rationale to section 1981 claims, it is suggested that the legislative intent
behind the 1866 Act should be the touchstone for determining the
correct standard of proof in section 1981 employment discrimination
94
actions.
88. See H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 23. See also Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); note 25 supra. See also H.R. REP. No.
238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2137, 2144. Congress acknowledged that discrimination in employment is a
"far more complex and persuasive phenomenon" than was acknowledged in
1964 and "can be described in terms of 'effects' rather than simply intentional
wrongs." Id.
89. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 437 U.S. at 437-38; note 15 supra.
The Jones Court found no compelling connection between the fourteenth
amendment and the 1870 re-enactment of the 1866 Act. See 437 U.S. at
437-38. For a discussion of the re-enactment history of the 1866 Act, see note
15 supra. For a discussion of Washington, see notes 34-38 and accompanying
text supra.
90. See notes 14-15 supra.
91. See 662 F.2d at 985; id. at 1006 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
92. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.
1978); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d
506 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. United States v. Banta, 434 U.S. 819
(1977); Commonwealth v. Rizzo, 466 F. Supp. 1219 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
93. Id. at 1006 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Gibbons noted that the majority's reliance on Washington was "peculiar"
in that the Washington Court had not addressed the question of congressional
authority to enact legislation including a disparate impact theory. Id.
94. As the Croker majority noted, the language and history of the 1866
Act do not conclusively provide an answer to the disparate impact/discriminatory intent issue. However, the history of the 1866 Act does reveal that
Congress intended that Act to eradicate the vestiges of slavery and to enforce
the guarantees of the thirteenth amendment. See notes 14-15 supra. It is
suggested that the Thirty-ninth Congress could not forsee the precise issue
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Finding that the intent of the Thirty-ninth Congress was ambiguous,
the Third Circuit relied upon the fact that the majority of the courts of
appeals have found that intent is required under section 1981. 5 The
Thirty-ninth Congress, however, intended section 1981 to "give practical
effect and force" to the thirteenth amendment9R It is suggested that an
impact standard supports this legislative purpose more fully than an
intent standard. The impact standard also comports with the power of
7
Congress to define the substantive scope of the thirteenth amendment
As the Thirty-ninth Congress determined that discrimination in employment is a badge and incident of slavery,98 it is submitted that section
1981 should be construed in a manner that would guarantee its continuing vitality 99 and its role in furthering the social policy of eradicating discrimination in employment. In conclusion, the requirement of
proof of intent in section 1981 employment discrimination actions will
erode the practical effect and force of this statute, contrary to the intent
of Congress.
Frances M. Visco

before the Croker court. Consequently, this issue should be decided in a
manner consistent with the general intent and spirit behind the 1866 Act.
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409. The Jones Court noted
that the 1866 Act's history revealed congressional intent to prohibit "all
racial discrimination affecting the basic civil rights enumerated in the Act."
Id. at 435 (emphasis supplied by the court). The purpose behind the 1866
Act was to assure that slavery was abolished "not only in name but in fact."
See Buchanan, supra note 14, at 16. It has been noted that the disparate
impact of employment practices upon blacks results in part from conditions
that are "part of the legacy of slavery and racial oppression." See Perry,
supra note 38, at 572.
95. 662 F.2d at 985, 988.
96. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 443, quoting CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (remarks of Rep. Thayer).
97. Id. at 433, 440. See also Buchanan, supra note 14, at 849. Buchanan
has stated that: "Jones affirmed the power of Congress to define the substantive scope of the thirteenth amendment." Id.
98. See, e.g., Young v. I.T. & T., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); note 20
supra.

99. See Buchanan, supra note 14, at 848. Buchanan notes: "Unless a
statute's language and legislative history plainly require it, a statute shoud
not be construed into practical impotence." Id.
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